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STRICT SCRUTINY FOR DENOMINATIONAL
PREFERENCES: LARSON IN RETROSPECT
Jeremy Patrick-Justice*
INTRODUCTION
Of all the contentious and divisive issues the United States Su-
preme Court has ruled on, few have provoked as much criticism,
both internally and from the public, as the Court’s rulings on relig-
ious freedom and the proper relationship between religion and
government.1  The criticism spans the political spectrum.  During
the past fifteen years, the Court has issued decisions that forbid
official prayer at high school graduations and football games,2 per-
mit public funds to be spent on vouchers for religious school stu-
dents,3 and sometimes allow, but sometimes prohibit, government-
sponsored religious symbolism such as creches.4
The internal division within the Court has led to frequent
adoption, rejection, and revision of the proper “test” to be applied
when considering Establishment Clause challenges.5  Underlying
* LL.M., University of Toronto (2004).  The author welcomes feedback at
jhaeman@hotmail.com and wishes to thank Jennifer Nedelsky and Daniel Justice.
1 See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT xviii (Univ. N.C. Press 1994) (1986) (“The establishment clause is a pe-
rennially disputatious topic, fraught with emotion.”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
107 n.6 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Many of our other Establishment Clause
cases have been decided by bare 5-4 majorities.”).  Indeed, the Court’s most recent
Establishment Clause decision was decided by a 5-4 count, and involved an issue
which had split public opinion. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002)
(upholding constitutionality of school vouchers).
2 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (graduations); Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (football games).
3 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644.
4 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (upholding display of
menorah but striking down display of creche); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984) (upholding display of creche).
5 See JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL IN-
TERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 38 (1995) (“[T]he existing state of governing
legal standards is both greatly in flux and riddled with major defects and inconsisten-
cies.”); LEVY, supra note 1, at 220 (“The Supreme Court has been inexcusably inconsis-
tent in its interpretation of the establishment clause.”).  As will be discussed in Section
III, the Court applied a three-pronged test for several years; under the test, a govern-
ment statute or practice would be held invalid under the Establishment Clause if it
lacked a secular purpose, had the effect of advancing religion, or created an excessive
entanglement with religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  The test
met with substantial criticism. See infra note 268.  In 1984, Justice O’Connor sug-
gested that an “endorsement” inquiry (“whether the government intends to convey a
53
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this debate is a similarly divisive debate over the core principles
embodied in the Establishment Clause.  Because judges and schol-
ars frequently appeal to history to validate their positions,6 much of
the scholarship in this area has focused on whether or not the Es-
tablishment Clause was intended to forbid promotion of religion
over nonreligion.7
However, there is an important and often-overlooked area of
consensus.  Judges and commentators nearly unanimously agree
that the Establishment Clause forbids the government from prefer-
ring some religious denominations over other religious denomina-
tions.8  This principle has strong historical roots and is often
message of endorsement or disapproval of religion”) should be part of the “effects”
prong. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Today, the “entangle-
ment” aspect of Lemon has been officially incorporated into the “effects” prong. See
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1997).
6 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
(“No provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given content by its gen-
erating history than the religious clause of the First Amendment.  It is at once the
refined product and the terse summation of that history.”); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD
D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.2, at 1160 (4th ed. 1991) (“There is a seem-
ingly irresistible impulse to appeal to history when analyzing issues under the religion
clauses.”); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exer-
cise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1413 (1990) (“Interpretations of the establish-
ment clause, then as well as now, are replete with extensive analyses of the historical
context and meaning.”).  Of course, understanding the history behind a constitu-
tional provision does not commit one to the position that it is the only permissible
factor to consider. See, e.g., id. at 1415 (“Even opponents of originalism generally
agree that the historical understanding is relevant, even if not dispositive.”).
7 Compare ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT
AND CURRENT FICTION (1982) (arguing that aid to religion generally was not forbid-
den by Establishment Clause) with Douglas Laycock, ‘Nonpreferential’ Aid to Religion: A
False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875 (1986) (arguing that even
nondiscriminatory aid to religion was forbidden).
8 See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 714 (1994) (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (“We have time and again held that the government generally may not
treat people differently based on the God or gods they worship, or do not worship.”);
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 605 (“Whatever else the Establishment Clause may mean . . . it
certainly means at the very least that government may not demonstrate a preference
for one particular sect or creed . . . .”); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 723 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“As we have repeatedly observed, the Religion Clauses were intended to ensure a
benign regime of competitive disorder among all denominations, so that each sect
was free to vie against the others for the allegiance of its followers without state inter-
ference.”); Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 (“Neither a state nor the Federal Government . . .
can pass laws which aid one religion . . . or prefer one religion over another.”);
CHOPER, supra note 5, at 15 (“Discrimination by government based on one’s possess-
ing (or not having) a certain faith imposes a penalty on religious prerogative and
interferes with true religious freedom . . .”); David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams,
Volitionism and Religious Liberty, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 889 (1991) (“Preservation of
government neutrality toward, and avoidance of official discrimination between, reli-
gions is one recurring concern in religion clause cases.”); Developments in the Law—
Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1693 (1987) [hereinafter Developments]
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considered one of the most fundamental guarantees of religious
freedom.9  Even Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, two of the Supreme
Court’s most conservative members and frequent critics of the idea
of “separation of church and state,” explicitly agree that denomina-
tional preferences are impermissible.10
In Larson v. Valente,11 the Supreme Court gave independent
force to the principle of denominational neutrality.  In holding
that laws granting denominational preferences must be closely fit-
ted to a compelling governmental interest,12 the Court stated that
“[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one
religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over an-
other.”13  The Court’s holding replaced the standard test14 with a
new strict scrutiny test.  It appeared that the Court had committed
itself to a new method of uncovering and eliminating religious
discrimination.
However, the initial promise of Larson never clearly material-
ized.  The case has not been overruled or explicitly doubted, yet
(“The vigor and clarity with which the Court has expounded the value of equal treat-
ment of religions suggest that, if directly implicated, this value would outweigh most
other considerations.”).  One of the earliest scholars of the religion clauses took a
different view, in what are now oft-quoted passages. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTA-
RIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES at 631-32 (5th ed. 1891) (“The real
object of the First Amendment was not to countenance, much less to advance,
Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but to exclude
all rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical establish-
ment . . . .”), quoted in CORD, supra note 7, at 13. Id. at 630-31 (“An attempt to level all
religions would have created universal disapprobation, if not universal indignation.”)
quoted in Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theol-
ogy to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 5 (2000).
9 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 1161 (2d ed.
1988) (“A growing body of evidence suggests that the Framers principally intended
the establishment clause to perform two functions: to protect state religious establish-
ments from national displacement, and to prevent the national government from aid-
ing some but not all religions.”); CORD, supra note 7, at 161 (“[I]t is historically clear
that the First Amendment was intended not only to preclude the establishment of a
national religion but also to prohibit Congress from giving any special significance to
any one religion or sect.”).
10 See Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 748 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I have always believed, and
all my opinions are consistent with the view, that the Establishment Clause prohibits
the favoring of one religion over others.”); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 113 (1985) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (“The Framers intended the Establishment Clause . . . to stop the
Federal Government from asserting a preference for one religious denomination or
sect over others.”).
11 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
12 See id. at 247.
13 Id. at 244.
14 The Court held that Lemon applied to laws benefiting all religions, whereas strict
scrutiny would henceforth apply to laws preferring certain religious denominations
over others. See id. at 252.
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the Supreme Court rarely applies the strict scrutiny test,15 lower
courts apply it in an inconsistent manner,16 and the meaning and
correct application of the case are still unclear over twenty years
after it was decided.17  Only one law review article is devoted to
Larson, and it was published just a year after the decision.18  Fur-
ther, the case is not included in most casebooks on religious free-
dom or general constitutional law19 and is therefore not well
known to most emerging legal scholars.
This Article analyzes the meaning of the Larson denomina-
tional preference test and discusses its current place in Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence.  Section II explains the methodology
employed in this analysis, while Section III provides a general back-
ground of the law prior to Larson.  Section IV examines the Larson
decision at length and describes how the Supreme Court has ap-
plied it since the case was decided.  The current meaning of Larson
and its application to Free Exercise and Equal Protection jurispru-
dence is discussed in Section V with an examination of how the test
relates to the Court’s normal Establishment Clause test.  Finally,
15 See infra Section IV.
16 See infra Section VI.
17 See TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-7 at 1192 (“The Larson Court failed to explain when
the new strict scrutiny approach applies.”); Stephen F. Rosenthal, Food for Thought:
Kosher Fraud Laws and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
951, 966 n.115 (1997) (“The Court’s precedents do not make clear when Larson strict
scrutiny or the Lemon test applies.”); Enid Trucios-Haynes, Religion and the Immigration
and Nationality Act: Using Old Saws on New Bones, 17 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 161,
204 (1996) (“The Court did not set forth any guiding criteria to find a denomina-
tional preference . . . .”); Joshua D. Zarrow, Of Crosses and Creches: The Establishment
Clause and Publicly Sponsored Displays of Religious Symbols, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 477, 489-90
(1986) (“Although the Larson decision appears to create a stricter establishment
clause review, it further obfuscates the application of establishment clause analysis.”)
(footnote omitted); Nancy Blyth Hersman, Note, Lynch v. Donnelly: Has the Lemon
Test Soured?, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133, 164 (1986) (“[T]here is confusion in the courts
as to when to use the Lemon or strict scrutiny tests[.]”).
18 See Daniel W. Evans, Note, Another Brick in The Wall: Denominational Preferences
and Strict Scrutiny Under the Establishment Clause, 62 NEB. L. REV. 359 (1983).  A short
summary of Larson is included in NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 6, § 17.16 at 1257-58,
while a slightly more in-depth discussion is included in TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-7 at
1191-93.
19 Most casebooks specifically on religious liberty do not include Larson. Compare 1
ROBERT T. MILLER & RONALD B. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH,
STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 154-164 (5th ed. 1996) (Larson included) with THE
CONSTITUTION AND RELIGION: LEADING SUPREME COURT CASES ON CHURCH AND STATE
(Robert S. Alley, ed., 1999) (Larson not included); MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A.
DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY (2d ed. 2002) (Larson men-
tioned, but not discussed); RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE CASES
THAT DEFINE THE DEBATE OVER CHURCH AND STATE (Terry Eastland ed., 1993) (same).
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Section VI examines how inferior federal courts and state courts
apply the Larson strict scrutiny test in practice.
Taken at face value, the Supreme Court in Larson created a
powerful new method for striking down legislation that prefers one
religious denomination over another.20  Because lawyers and
judges continue to raise and examine Larson-based challenges to
government conduct,21 an inquiry into the meaning of the case is
not a mere exercise in academic curiosity; indeed, it may help to
shed an important light on the future of American Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
II. METHODOLOGY
This Article examines the meaning and application of the Lar-
son denominational preference test through a descriptive approach
by focusing on the interpretation and effect given to Larson by the
Supreme Court and lower courts, while avoiding normative judg-
ments as to whether those cases were “correctly” decided or
whether the Establishment Clause “really” means one thing or an-
other.22  However, attention will be given to whether the various
20 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 9, § 16-6, at 1453-54 (“[T]he device of strict scrutiny is
most powerfully employed for the examination of political outcomes challenged as
injurious to those groups in society which have occupied, as a consequence of wide-
spread, insistent prejudice against them, the position of perennial losers in the politi-
cal struggle.”); Zarrow, supra note 17, at 489 n.76 (“Strict scrutiny appears to be a
more stringent standard for establishment clause analysis in view of the malleable
nature of the Lemon criteria.  The Lemon test requires merely that state action have a
secular purpose, whereas strict scrutiny requires that state action have a compelling
state purpose.”) (citation omitted).
21 See, e.g., Children’s Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Min De Parle, 212 F.3d
1084, 1090 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e initially must determine whether [the challenged
activity] discriminates among religious sects.  If so, we apply strict scrutiny review
under [Larson].  If not, we administer the three-part test set forth by the Supreme
Court in [Lemon.]”) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); ACLU Neb. Found. v.
Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1031 n.7 (D. Neb. 2002), aff’d, 358 F.3d 1020 (8th
Cir. 2004), reh’g granted and opinion vacated, No. 02-2444, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 6636
(8th Cir. Apr. 6, 2004).
22 Judgments of this type are plentiful in the literature, but to be useful require a
careful, robust, and coherent framework for analyzing Establishment Clause cases. See
generally Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 869-70 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that the Establishment Clause “eludes elegant conceptualization simply because
the prohibition applies to such distinct phenomena as state churches and aid to relig-
ious schools . . . .  Any criteria, moreover, must not only define the margins of the
establishment prohibition, but must respect the succeeding Clause of the First
Amendment guaranteeing religion’s free exercise.  It is no wonder that the comple-
mentary constitutional provisions and the inexhaustibly various circumstances of their
applicability have defied any simple test and have instead produced a combination of
general rules often in tension at their edges.”) (citation omitted). See also Matthew S.
Steffey, Redefining the Modern Constraints of the Establishment Clause: Separable Principles of
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interpretations of Larson provided in different cases are consistent
and coherent.
Sources used in this Article include the standard collection of
cases, articles, and books, as well as briefs and oral argument tran-
scripts from leading Supreme Court cases.  The latter category of
sources help to determine whether the Larson test has been will-
fully ignored by the Supreme Court or whether parties have simply
not raised it as controlling authority.
Finally, although extensive attention will be given to doctrine
and language, this Article adopts a version of the classical legal re-
alist approach:23 particular linguistic formulations of rules and
principles are not entirely without importance, but legal decision-
making is heavily influenced by the values of the individual deci-
sion-maker, the pressures brought to bear by society, and the sym-
pathy (or lack thereof) engendered by the parties before the court.
For example, in the related context of the Free Exercise Clause,
many commentators bemoaned24 the Supreme Court’s adoption of
a “neutral and generally applicable test” in 1990 which was doctri-
nally less protective of religious liberty than the former strict scru-
tiny test.25  However, subsequent analysis demonstrates that even
under the apparently robust strict scrutiny test, plaintiffs rarely suc-
ceed in their Free Exercise claims before the Supreme Court.26
Equality, Subsidy, Endorsement, and Church Autonomy, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 903, 907 n.13
(1992) (listing various proposals to “fix” the Establishment Clause).  The ambitious
task of adopting or creating such an analytical framework is outside the scope of this
Article.
23 See generally Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Jerome Frank, What Courts Do In Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV.
645 (1932).
24 See, e.g., Stuart G. Parsell, Note, Revitalization of the Free Exercise of Religion Under
State Constitutions: A Response to Employment Division v. Smith, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
747, 753 n.40 (1993) (citing examples).
25 See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
26 See John Thomas Bannon, Jr., The Legality of the Religious Use of Peyote by the Native
American Church: A Commentary on the Free Exercise, Equal Protection, and Establishment
Issues Raised by the Peyote Way Church of God Case, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 475, 480
(1998) (“While the pre-Smith test appeared highly protective of religious liberty, it
clearly was not . . .”); Daniel A. Crane, Beyond RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion Comes of Age
in the State Courts, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 235, 252 (1998) (“Commentators generally
share the view that strict scrutiny pre-Smith was anything but strict.”); Mark Tushnet,
The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 BYU. L. REV. 117, 121-22 (discussing pre-
Smith cases).  As has been noted by other commentators, although different formula-
tions of the Free Exercise Clause test may not have affected decision-making at the
Supreme Court level, varied test formulations have resulted in different outcomes in
the lower courts.  Lower courts face a far greater number of constitutional claims and
have less leeway to ignore or manipulate Supreme Court precedent.  For that reason,
Section VI examines state and lower federal courts’ use of Larson.  Finally, it is worth
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Thus, in discussing the Larson strict scrutiny test in the context of
the Establishment Clause, close attention will be paid to whether
application or omission of the test would have made a difference in
outcome.
III. PRE-LARSON ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution
provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion . . . .”27  The Establishment Clause has only played
an important role in the Supreme Court’s religious freedom juris-
prudence since the middle part of the twentieth century,28 even
though it is part of the original Bill of Rights.  Modern Establish-
ment Clause doctrine can largely be traced to the Court’s 1947 de-
cision in Everson v. Board of Education.29 Everson, which dealt with
the constitutionality of publicly-funded transportation of children
to religious schools, was significant for three reasons.  First, it was
the first time that the Court struggled with substantive issues re-
quiring an analysis of the Establishment Clause.30  Second, it offi-
cially held that the Establishment Clause applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment under the Court’s doctrine
of incorporation.31  Third, the justices unanimously agreed with
this oft-quoted passage:
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
noting that reported decisions are not the only measure of a doctrine’s effect.  For
example, looking solely at reported caselaw does not reveal some of the other possible
affects of Larson, such as whether the decision has deterred Congress from enacting
legislation containing denominational preferences and whether attorneys have be-
come more likely to advise their clients to challenge such legislation.
27 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
28 See CORD, supra note 7, at 108 (“[I]t is accurate to say that prior to the Everson
‘Bus Transportation’ Case [in 1947], the U.S. Supreme Court cases that involved the
Establishment of Religion Clause were minute in number and none were of any signif-
icant value in determining just what legislation that Clause constitutionally prohib-
ited.”). See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 n.2 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (summarizing pre-Everson Establishment Clause cases).
29 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
30 See CORD, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
31 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8.  The Establishment Clause, as part of the First Amend-
ment, was held in dicta to be applicable to the states in earlier cases such as Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943) and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303 (1940).  There is now some mounting (and unprecedented) internal criticism of
the Court’s decision to incorporate the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Zelman v. Sim-
mons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678-79 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). See generally Wil-
liam K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of
Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191 (1990).
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can set up a church.  Neither can pass laws which aid one relig-
ion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion.  No person can be punished for en-
tertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance.  No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institu-
tions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion.  Neither a state nor the Fed-
eral Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the af-
fairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.  In
the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of relig-
ion by law was intended to erect “a wall of separation between
church and State.”32
As comprehensive and clear as this passage appears, it proved
much harder to apply in practice.  Indeed, the Court in Everson
split 5-4, with the majority voting to uphold the subsidized busing
of religious school students.33
Over the next two decades, the Court did not apply the Estab-
lishment Clause frequently; however, when it did, important issues
were at stake.34  In 1971, the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman35 distilled
several principles from its previous cases and announced a three-
prong test for adjudicating Establishment Clause claims.  Under
the Lemon test, legislation would be upheld if all three of the fol-
lowing conditions were satisfied: “First, the statute must have a sec-
ular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the stat-
ute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with
religion.’”36  The flexible Lemon test37 continues to be the primary
method of evaluating conduct under the Establishment Clause38
even though it has met frequent criticism and revision.
32 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878)).
33 Id. at 18.
34 See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (mandatory school prayers); Abing-
ton v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (mandatory Bible reading); Walz v. Tax
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemption for churches and other places of
worship).
35 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
36 Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).
37 See infra Part V.F.
38 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 648-49 (applying Lemon). See also NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 6, § 17.3 at 1162 (“The Supreme Court applies the three part test . . . in
virtually all establishment clause cases.”); Glenn S. Gordon, Note, Lynch v. Donnelly:
Breaking Down the Barriers to Religious Displays, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 185, 192 (1985)
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Understanding the Court’s Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence is a difficult task because the cases reveal a muddle of con-
flicting holdings and inconsistent reasoning.39  However, one
consistent concern among both liberal and conservative justices is
preserving the principle of neutrality.40  The principle of neutrality
can be as vague a concept41 as “equality” or “liberty,” but in the
context of the Establishment Clause, the principle has been used
in one of three ways: “ ‘Neutrality’ has been employed as a term to
describe the requisite state of government equipoise between the
forbidden encouragement and discouragement of religion; to
characterize a benefit or aid as secular; and to indicate even-
handedness in distributing it.”42
Often implicit in the discussion of neutrality between religion
and secularism is the principle of neutrality between denomina-
tions;43 a principle that many see as the original and fundamental
purpose of the Establishment Clause.44  For instance, many of the
original English colonists fled to North America to escape laws
forcing them to support and take part in religions other than their
(“[T]he Lemon test, with its separationist tenor, has served as the cornerstone of estab-
lishment clause analysis.”).
39 See Alison Wheeler, Separatist Religious Groups and the Establishment Clause—Board
of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 223, 223 (1995) (“The Court’s application of the Lemon test in the ensuing
twenty-three years has prompted an increasing volume of criticism from both academ-
ics and jurists complaining of inconsistency, unpredictability and ad hoc decisionmak-
ing.”) (footnotes omitted).
40 See TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-7 at 1188-1201 (discussing four kinds of neutrality
toward religion: strict, political, denominational, and free exercise); Michael W. Mc-
Connell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 146 (1987); John T.
Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 83
(1986). See generally Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality
Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990).
41 See CHOPER, supra note 5, at 20 (“[T]he principle of neutrality may be formu-
lated in a variety of ways, and the abstract notion of equality demands further con-
tent.”) (footnote omitted); Laycock, supra note 40, at 994 (“We can agree on the
principle of neutrality without having agreed on anything at all.  From benevolent
neutrality to separate but equal, people with a vast range of views on church and state
have all claimed to be neutral.”) (footnotes omitted); Michael A. Paulsen, Religion,
Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudi-
cation, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 333 (1986) (“‘Neutrality’ like ‘equality,’ is a prin-
ciple of relationship, not of content.  A statement such as ‘the state should be neutral’
is completely vacuous . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
42 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 878 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
43 See Conkle, supra note 8, at 8 (“The requirement of denominational equality
demands that all religions be treated equally.  The broader notion of religious neu-
trality includes the requirement of denominational equality, but it also goes one step
further, demanding that the government neither favor nor disfavor religion in gen-
eral, as compared to nonreligion.”).
44 See supra note 8.
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own.45  However, the new settlers quickly replicated the very same
establishments of religion they had fled.  Before the Revolutionary
War:
Catholics found themselves hounded and proscribed because of
their faith; Quakers who followed their conscience went to jail;
Baptists were peculiarly obnoxious to certain dominant Protes-
tant sects; men and women of varied faiths who happened to be
in a minority in a particular locality were persecuted . . . .  And
all of these dissenters were compelled to pay tithes and taxes to
support government-sponsored churches . . . .46
However, by the time the Bill of Rights was ratified, no state
had an establishment of religion that effectually preferred one de-
nomination over another,47 although seven states still had estab-
lishments of religion.48  Even so, Protestant dominance in law and
society continued throughout the eighteenth century and most of
the nineteenth.49  Indeed, one commentator argues that it was not
until the 1960s that American society “firmly embraced” the con-
cept of denominational neutrality.50  Today the United States is
home to more than one thousand religious faiths51 and has a “soci-
45 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947). See also McConnell, supra note
6, at 1421 (“During the early settlement of the colonies in the seventeenth century,
England suffered from chronic religious strife and intolerance.”).
46 Everson, 330 U.S. at 10 (footnotes omitted). See also LEVY, supra note 1, at 1 (“On
the eve of the American Revolution most of the colonies maintained establishments
of religion.  Those colonies . . . discriminated against Roman Catholics, Jews, and
even dissenting Protestants who refused to comply with local laws benefiting establish-
ments of religion.”); McConnell, supra note 6, at 1422-30 (discussing different ap-
proaches of colonies to religious freedom).
47 See id. at 10-11 (“An establishment of Christianity or of Protestantism in the
American states that permitted an establishment in about 1790 would have been, for
practical purposes, a comprehensive or nonpreferential establishment, permitting
government aid to all churches or to religion generally.  No American state at the
time maintained an establishment in the European sense of having an exclusive or
state church designated by law.”); Laycock, supra note 7, at 898 (“It is anachronistic to
view aid to all denominations of Christians as preferential in 1786.  There were hardly
any Jews in the United States at that time, and no other non-Christians to speak of
. . . . [A]id to all Christians was viewed as nonpreferential in the late eighteenth cen-
tury.”); McConnell, supra note 6, at 1466 (“The American colonies were peopled al-
most entirely by adherents of various strains of Protestant Christianity.  The Protestant
moral code and mode of worship was, for the most part, harmonious with the mores
of the larger society.”) (footnote omitted).
48 See LEVY, supra note 1, at xxii.
49 See Conkle, supra note 8, at 4 (“[T]hroughout most of our country’s history,
there has been an overt Christian, and primarily Protestant, dominance in American
law and public life.”).
50 See id. at 6.  Conkle also notes that the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968 were
the first Federal statutes prohibiting religious discrimination in public
accommodations.
51 According to J. GORDON MELTON, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGIONS
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etal norm of religious toleration.”52
It is not clear why a law that prefers some denominations over
others is necessarily worse than a law that prefers religion over non-
religion.  In either case, a small minority (whether of atheists and
agnostics, or of unpopular religious believers) may be compelled
to practice or support a government policy that violates their most
fundamental beliefs.  On the other hand, laws that endorse relig-
ion of general or specific denominations may not actually influ-
ence religious belief.  One commentator notes:
Statutes classifying along religious lines often may have virtually
no discernible effect on the actual exercise or nonexercise of
religion.  Surprisingly enough, this might even be said of an offi-
cially established, but completely liberal and tolerant, national
religion.  The establishment clauses’s text itself, however, com-
mands the presumption that such arrangements have deleteri-
ous effects on religious freedom, even when they are extremely
subtle.53
Although the Supreme Court first held in 1982 that laws which
prefer some denominations over others would be subject to strict
scrutiny, the Larson case was not the first time that the Court faced
a claim that a law preferred some religions over others and was
therefore invalid under the Establishment, Free Exercise, or Equal
Protection Clauses.54  Because Larson relied in part on these cases,
(3d ed. 1989) there are at least 1,588 religious groups in the United States and Ca-
nada. See also JOHN F. WILSON, PUBLIC RELIGION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 47 (1979)
(“Empirically speaking, not only is the United States extraordinary among the mod-
ernized societies of the world in the degree of religious activity and affiliation within it,
it is also extraordinary in the number of different religions which are vital within it.”)
52 Conkle, supra note 8, at 8.
53 Paulsen, supra note 41, at 341 n.130.
54 As we shall see, the statement in Evans, supra note 18, at 377, that “prior to
Larson, the Court was never confronted with a case framed as discrimination among
religions” and similar remarks in Gordon, supra note 38, at 191 (relying on Evans),
are not precisely accurate, especially when the Free Exercise Clause is considered.  It
should also be noted that in many of the cases framed as whether religion was being
advanced over nonreligion, the existence of denominational preferences were im-
plicit and may have influenced the result.  For example, in his dissent in Everson v. Bd.
of Educ., Justice Jackson noted that the school board resolution authorizing public
transportation for private school students applied only to Catholic schools. See Ever-
son v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 25 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“if the school is a Catholic
one [school authorities] may render aid because it is such, while if it is of any other
faith or is run for profit, the help must be withheld.”).  Similarly, the Bible readings
struck down in Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 207 (1963), were usually from the
Protestant King James version rather than the Catholic Douay version, and the plural-
ity in Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 744 (1976) noted that four of
the five religious institutional recipients of a public educational funding scheme were
Roman Catholic Church-affiliated colleges.  In the Free Exercise context, Justice
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understanding them is an important part of understanding the de-
nominational preferences test.
Just four years after Everson was decided, the Supreme Court in
Niemotko v. Maryland55  heard a discrimination case brought by a
group of Jehovah’s Witnesses who claimed that they were discrimi-
nated against in the use of a public park because city officials re-
peatedly denied them a permit to hold religious services in the
park even though such permits had been issued for other religious
organizations.56  The Court held the city’s refusal unconstitutional,
stating that “[t]he conclusion is inescapable that the use of the
park was denied because of the City Council’s dislike for or disa-
greement with the Witnesses or their views.”57
Two years later, Niemotko was used as the basis to strike down a
municipal by-law in Fowler v. Rhode Island.58  The circumstances
were similar in that Jehovah’s Witnesses were arrested for holding
religious services in a public park.  The challenged law in Fowler
provided that:
No person shall address any political or religious meeting in any
public park; but this section shall not be construed to prohibit
any political or religious club or society from visiting any public
park in a body, provided that no public address shall be made
under the auspices of such club or society in such park.59
Because the law appeared neutral on its face, the parties de-
voted most of their briefing and argument to the issue of whether
the law complied with Supreme Court precedent on prior restraint
Brennan noted in McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 632 n.4 (1978) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring), that a statute disqualifying “ministers” from holding political office may “dis-
criminate among religions by depriving ministers of faiths with established, clearly
recognizable ministries from holding elective office, while permitting the members of
nonorthodox humanistic faiths having no ‘counterpart’ to ministers, similarly en-
gaged to do so.”) (citation omitted).  In Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per
curiam), the Court reversed the lower court’s determination that religious discrimina-
tion in prisons could not be the basis for a Free Exercise claim. See id. at 322 (“If Cruz
was a Buddhist and if he was denied a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith
comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional
religious precepts, then there was palpable discrimination by the State against the
Buddhist religion . . . . If the allegations of this complaint are assumed to be true, as
they must be on the motion to dismiss, Texas has violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.”).
55 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
56 See id. at 272-73.
57 Id. at 272.  The exact constitutional guarantee implicated in Niemotko is not clear
from the case, as free speech, free exercise of religion, and equal protection language
is used in various places in the Court’s opinion. See id. at 272-73.
58 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
59 Id. at 67.
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of speech.60  However, at oral argument the attorney for the city
admitted that the ordinance had been interpreted in the past to
allow other religious groups to meet and hold worship services in
the park.61  This concession was fatal to the city’s case, “[f]or it
plainly shows that a religious service of Jehovah’s Witnesses is
treated differently than a religious service of other sects.  That
amounts to the state preferring some religious groups over this
one.”62  As in Niemotko, the majority found the law invalid under
the First Amendment, while Justice Frankfurter concurred under
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.63
The case most clearly and viscerally implicating discrimination
between religious beliefs is Gillette v. United States.64  Although Gil-
lette would eventually serve as an important, but ambiguous, prece-
dent for Larson and other denominational preference cases,65 the
case had immediate impact as well.  In the middle of national tur-
moil over the Vietnam War, the Supreme Court examined the con-
stitutionality of a federal statute providing exemptions from
compulsory military service for some religious conscientious objec-
tors, but not others.66  The statute provided exemptions from the
draft for persons opposed “to participation in war in any form,” but
not to persons with religious objections only to “particular” wars.67
Accordingly, the district courts denied the plaintiffs’ draft exemp-
tions because they did not object to war in every form, even though
the sincerity of their religious beliefs was conceded by the
government.68
60 See id. at 69.
61 See id. (“Catholics could hold mass in Slater Park and Protestants could conduct
their church services there without violating the ordinance.”).
62 Id. at 69.
63 Id. at 70 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Nietmotko, 340 U.S. at 284 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).  It is not clear in either Niemotko or Fowler whether the portion of the
First Amendment referred to is the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause.
Regardless, the analyses and holdings are relevant as background to Larson. See, e.g.,
TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-2 at 1157 (“[T]o the extent that the two [religion] clauses
are understood as reinforcing one another, doctrines developed under one are rele-
vant to the other as well.”).  The two cases are still cited occasionally by the Supreme
Court in the context of religious discrimination. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) (citing both Fowler and Niemotko).
64 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
65 See infra Section IV.  As will be discussed, Gillette has been used to undermine the
Larson strict scrutiny test.
66 See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 456(j) (Supp. V 1964). See generally Michael S. Satow,
Conscientious Objectors: Their Status, the Law and Its Development, 3 GEO. MASON U. CIV.
RTS. L.J. 113 (1992).
67 Gillette, 401 U.S. at 443.
68 Id. at 439-40.
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Unlike other cases framed as religious discrimination, this was
not an issue of unintentional disparate impact on certain religious
groups.69 Rather, Congress specifically legislated that certain relig-
ious beliefs would be grounds for an exemption and others would
not.  Nor was it a case involving religiously-motivated conduct as op-
posed to mere belief.70  Instead, Gillette involved two classes of sin-
cere religious believers: those who believed that the Vietnam War
was wrong, and that some but not all other wars were wrong; and
those who believed that the Vietnam War and all other wars were
wrong.  Thus, the religious belief directly implicated by the exemp-
tions sought at the time (objection to the Vietnam War) was the
same in both cases; the difference was that one class of persons had
an additional religious belief.  Finally, to make the issue even more
pointed, the consequences to the plaintiffs and others lacking the
particular religious beliefs Congress required were the most severe
the Court ever adjudicated in the context of the Establishment
Clause: war and possible death.
Eight of the nine justices voted to uphold the exemption
against the Establishment Clause challenge.  Under the reasoning
of the majority, although the Establishment Clause forbids even
“subtle departures from neutrality,”71 laws that categorize persons
according to religious belief need only be justified by showing that
the lines drawn have “neutral, secular reasons”72 and are “neither
arbitrary nor invidious.”73  The Court held that the draft exemp-
tion could be limited to persons with the religious belief that all
war is wrong because it “serves a number of valid purposes having
nothing to do with a design to foster or favor any sect, religion, or
cluster of religions,”74 chief among them being the ability to gather
manpower and to administer exemption claims easily and fairly.75
69 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
70 See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990).
71 Gillette, 401 U.S. at 452.
72 Id. at 449 n.14.
73 Id. at 452.
74 Id.
75 See id. at 455-56.  The Court also found that this formed a compelling interest
sufficient to defeat the plaintiffs’ Free Exercise Clause claims. See id. at 461-62.  Al-
though the Gillette Court states that the burdens are “strictly justified by a substantial
governmental interest[,]” I understand this language to be equivalent to the tradi-
tional strict scrutiny test, which requires the government’s interest to be “compelling.”
This reading is justified because the Court discussed the Free Exercise challenge with
reference to Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 402 (1963), which established the strict scru-
tiny test for Free Exercise challenges.  I do not believe that the Court was attempting
to create a new, lower standard in Gillette.  This reading is further supported by subse-
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Taken as a whole, Gillette seems to stand for the proposition
that laws distinguishing between religious beliefs or denominations
need only be justified by demonstrating a secular purpose and
showing some sort of rational basis between that purpose and the
classification.  As discussed in the next two sections, Gillette was dis-
tinguished in Larson when the Court announced the strict scrutiny
test.  Although the holding in Gillette is probably sound considering
the traditional deference the Court pays to military affairs,76 the
reasoning of the case seems to conflict with the rule announced in
Larson.
IV. LARSON IN THE SUPREME COURT
A. Larson v. Valente
Although analyzing the meaning and limits of the Larson de-
nominational preferences test is a difficult task, the facts of the case
itself are relatively straightforward.  In 1961, Minnesota created a
comprehensive scheme to regulate charitable organizations within
the state.77  The legislation imposed a variety of registration and
record-keeping requirements, including detailed annual reports
on income, costs of administration, fundraising, and transfers of
funds.78  For the first several years of the Charitable Solicitations
Act’s existence, religious groups were exempted from the require-
ments.79  However, in 1978 the Minnesota Legislature made several
changes to the Act, including one amendment that made the Act
applicable to certain religious groups.  Under the new amend-
ment, religious organizations were presumed to be covered by the
statute unless they received more than half of their contributions
from members.80
quent caselaw, including Valente. See infra note 89 (“Such preference is in conflict
with the amendment prohibiting establishment of religion by law, in the absence of
compelling secular justification like those sustained in Gillette.”).
76 See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
77 See MINN. STAT. §§ 309.50-309.61 (2004) for the current version of this statute.
78 See Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d 562, 569 (8th Cir. 1981).  The Eighth Circuit
noted that “such an audit does not spring full blown without considerable expense
and administrative coordination” (quoting Heritage Vill. & Missionary Fellowship,
Inc. v. North Carolina, 263 S.E.2d 726, 733 (N.C. 1980), aff’d, 456 U.S. 228 (1982)).
79 See Valente, 637 F.2d at 564 n.3.
80 See id. at 564.  The Act provided an exemption for a “religious society or organi-
zation which received more than half of the contributions it received in the account-
ing year last ended (1) from persons who are members of the organization; or (2)
from a parent organization or affiliated organization; or (3) from a combination of
the sources listed in clauses (1) and (2).” Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 309.515(1)(b)
(1982)).
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In October of 1978, four individual members of the Unifica-
tion Church81 filed suit in federal district court, alleging that they
often solicited funds for the Church from the public, and that the
Act’s new amendments burdened their individual rights to free-
dom of speech, religion, and equal protection of the laws.82  In an
unreported decision,83 the trial judge granted summary judgment
for the plaintiffs and held the Act’s provisions unconstitutional as
applied to religious organizations84 because they discriminated
against certain religious groups, and thus violated the “effects”
prong of Lemon.85  The result of the court’s ruling was that the law
returned to its pre-1978 form, exempting all religious organiza-
tions from the registration, record-keeping, and reporting
requirements.86
A unanimous panel of the Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial
court’s decision.87  The Court of Appeals focused on the Establish-
ment Clause question, stating that “[a]ll parties agree that the ma-
jor legal issue in this case is whether the classification made in a
religious exemption contained in the Act is invalid because of its
unequal application to different religious organizations.”88  The
Court agreed with the district court’s ruling that the classification
81 The official name for the Unification Church is the Holy Spirit Association for
the Unification of World Christianity, while a disparaging nomenclature for the
group is “Moonies,” coined from the name of the religion’s founder, Sun Myung
Moon.  The guiding principle of the religion is that Jesus Christ’s mission on Earth
went unfulfilled, and that the Unification Church should undertake the task of restor-
ing the world after the initial fall from divine grace. See generally J. GORDON MELTON,
ENCYCLOPEDIC HANDBOOK OF CULTS IN AMERICA 195-96 (1986).  It should be noted
that the word “cult” in the title of Melton’s book, and throughout this article, is used
in the sociological sense of a small religious group and not as a normative judgment
as to the group’s validity. See, e.g., David A. Nock, The Organization of Religious Life in
Canada, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION: A CANADIAN FOCUS 56-57 (W.E. Hewitt ed.,
1993) (“Most sociologists use a definition of cult that is quite different.  This defini-
tion simply refers to religious movements that are new to the conventional religious
tradition of a society.”).
82 See Complaint for Injunction and Declaratory Judgment, Joint Appendix at A-2,
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (No. 80-1666), available at LEXIS 1980 U.S.
Briefs 1666.  Because Minnesota had already initiated litigation in state court against
the Unification Church to bring it into compliance with the Act, the parties stipulated
that the Church would be re-aligned as a plaintiff alongside the original four plaintiffs
in the federal action. See Stipulation and Order, Joint Appendix at A-14, Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (No. 80-1666), available at LEXIS 1980 U.S. Briefs 1666.
83 Brief for Appellants at 2, Larson (No. 80-1666), available at 1981 WL 390107.
84 See Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d 562, 564 (8th Cir. 1981).
85 Brief for Appellants at 5, Larson (No. 80-1666), available at 1981 WL 390107.
86 See Brief of Appellees at 9, Larson (No. 80-1666), available at LEXIS 1980 U.S.
Briefs 1666.
87 See Valente, 637 F.2d at 564.
88 Id.
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violated the effects prong of Lemon,89 but based its holding on the
test’s “purpose” prong.90  Although neither the district court nor
the appellate court received evidence of the Minnesota Legisla-
ture’s purpose in passing the legislation,91 the Eighth Circuit in-
ferred from the nature of the statutory classification that an
intentional “religious gerrymander” was probably at work because
the State was unable to adequately explain why traditional religious
organizations were usually exempt from the Act, while new or less
traditional religions generally had to comply.92
On appeal before the United States Supreme Court, Minne-
sota focused its defense of the Act on three grounds.  First, it ar-
gued that the plaintiffs simply did not have standing to challenge
the constitutionality of a partial exemption for religious organiza-
tions because the Unification Church had not established that it
was a religious organization.93  Second, the State suggested that
both the district court and the Court of Appeals had improperly
89 See id. at 568-69 (noting that religious organizations subject to the Act “will suf-
fer material burdens” while others “will enjoy complete exemption”).  Although men-
tioned only in passing and not discussed, this portion of the court’s ruling may be the
first suggestion that laws preferring some religions over others should be subject to
strict scrutiny under the Establishment Clause. See id. at 569 (“We must conclude that
the Minnesota statute prefers some religions over others.  Such preference is in con-
flict with the amendment prohibiting establishment of religion by law, in the absence
of compelling secular justifications like those sustained in Gillette.”).  Under tradi-
tional Supreme Court precedent, the purpose and effects prong of Lemon do not, at
least officially, involve a consideration of whether or not the State had a compelling
interest in passing the law. See Evans, supra note 18, at 368 n.51.  In Gillette, the Su-
preme Court discussed the compelling interest test in the context of a Free Exercise
Clause challenge; the Eighth Circuit’s importation of this language into an Establish-
ment Clause challenge would be noted and criticized by Minnesota on appeal before
the Supreme Court. See Brief for Appellants at 23, Larson (No. 80-1666), available at
1981 WL 390107 (“The compelling secular justification in Gillette was pertinent only to
the free exercise claim adjudicated therein, and there is no free exercise claim before
this Court.”).
90 See Valente, 637 F.2d at 567-68.  The Court did not reach the entanglement
prong of Lemon. See id. at 569.
91 Brief for Appellants at 12-13, 16 Larson (No. 80-1666), available at 1981 WL
390107.
92 See Valente, 637 F.2d at 566 (“[I]t may be inferred that the draftsmen of this
legislation wished to reduce the burdens otherwise imposed on well-established
churches which had achieved strong but not total financial support from their mem-
bers; the draftsmen have exhibited less concern for easing regulations applicable to
churches which are new and lacking in a constituency, or which, as a matter of policy,
may favor public solicitation over general reliance on financial support from mem-
bers.”).  The Court found this failure to articulate a secular reason for the religious
classification to be sufficient grounds for ruling that the Gillette “neutral, secular” cri-
teria rule had not been met. See id. at 567-68.
93 See Brief for Appellants at 31-34 Larson (No. 80-1666), available at 1981 WL
390107.
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considered legislative motive.94  Finally, and most importantly,
Minnesota rested its defense of the statute on the Supreme Court’s
prior ruling in Gillette that a religious classification need only be
justified by showing a “neutral, secular” purpose.95  The State ar-
gued that the classification was justified because members who give
to their religious organizations are more aware of how their funds
are used than non-members who give to religious organizations,
and also have a statutory right to inspect the records of these orga-
nizations.96  In the State’s view, the fact that the classification had a
disparate impact on some religious groups did not make it uncon-
stitutional under the Gillette rule.97
The Unification Church made a bold move in its argument
before the Supreme Court.  The Church argued that even though
the Lemon test had been applied in every Establishment Clause
challenge since it was announced,98 it should not be applied
because:
This case invokes the fundamental strand of establishment
clause doctrine of government neutrality as among groups of
religious organizations.  The three-fold test of [Lemon], which is
of greatest utility in sorting out the subtle constitutional
problems involved in the provision of government aid to all reli-
gions, is therefore unnecessary to apply here.99
Instead, the Church urged a rule that would only uphold a
religious classification “upon a convincing showing that it is sub-
stantially related to a significant governmental interest.”100  Fur-
ther, the Church met Minnesota’s Gillette argument by making a
distinction between laws which have a de facto disparate impact on
religious groups because of secular rules, and laws which have a de
94 Id. at 15-17.
95 Id. at 20-30.
96 Id. at 11.
97 Id. at 21-22. See also Evans, supra note 18, at 366 (“The state’s principal conten-
tion was that a law may have a disparate impact on religious organizations without
offending the establishment clause as long as the differentiating criteria were neutral
and secularly based.”).
98 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (noting that, as of 1984,
the only two occasions that the Court had not applied the Lemon test were Larson and
a case decided subsequent to it, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)).
99 Brief of Appellees at 12, Larson (No. 80-1666), available at LEXIS 1980 U.S.
Briefs 1666.  The Church argued in the alternative that even if Lemon did apply, the
Act failed all three prongs of the test. Id.
100 Id. at 11.  Interestingly, this suggested rule (“substantial” relation to a “signifi-
cant” interest) would require intermediate scrutiny, not the strict scrutiny that the
Court eventually adopted in Larson. See, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 6, § 14.3
at 575-78 (comparing strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny tests).
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jure disparate impact on religious groups because of the use of a
religious classification in the statute itself.101  Because the chal-
lenged Act created the latter form of disparate impact, the Church
argued, it should be subject to greater scrutiny than the mere “neu-
tral, secular” rule of Gillette.102
The State countered that the Church’s proposed test “has
never been an aspect of establishment clause analysis”103 and that
the Church failed to show how such a test “even remotely relates to
establishment clause principles.”104  Further, the State argued that
the distinction between de jure and de facto religious classifications
was irrelevant insofar as each could be saved under Gillette by dem-
onstrating a neutral, secular basis for the differing treatment.105
Although Minnesota was the sole defender of the Act’s consti-
tutionality, six different amicus briefs were filed in support of the
Unification Church.106  Only two amici supported the Church’s
claim that some form of stricter review should be applied to laws
creating religious classifications,107 but all of them argued, at least
101 See Brief of Appellees at 17, Larson (No. 80-1666), available at LEXIS 1980 U.S.
Briefs 1666.  The Church argued that de jure disparate impacts were worse than de facto
disparate impacts because the former are “symbolically inappropriate under the estab-
lishment clause,” are more susceptible to the religious biases of legislators, and are far
more “readily avoidable.” Id. at 19.
102 See id. at 18 (“[T]here is a much greater danger of improper legislative motiva-
tion, in the form of either favoritism or hostility, where a law speaks expressly in terms
of religion than where it is neutral on its face but has only a disparate religious im-
pact.  The more a law focuses expressly upon so constitutionally sensitive a considera-
tion, the more likely it is that legislators, consciously or unconsciously, will be affected
in their deliberations by their expectations as to the likely impact of the legislation.”).
Id. at 20.
103 Reply Brief at 9, Larson (No. 80-1666), available at 1981 WL 390109.
104 Id.
105 See id. at 4.
106 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Greater Minneapolis Association of Evangelicals, Lar-
son (No. 80-1666), available at 1981 WL 390118; Brief of Amici Curiae General Confer-
ence of Seventh-Day Adventists, et al., Larson (No. 80-1666), available at 1981 WL
390115; Brief of Amicus Curiae the Center for Law and Religious Freedom of the
Christian Legal Society in Support of Appellees, Larson (No. 80-1666), available at
1981 WL 390114; Brief of Amicus Curiae Americans United for Separation of Church
and State Fund, Inc., Larson (No. 80-1666), available at 1981 WL 390113; Brief of
Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, et al., Larson (No. 80-1666), available at
1981 WL 390110; Brief of Amicus Curiae American Jewish Congress, Larson (No. 80-
1666), available at 1981 WL 390112.
107 Both amici followed the lead of the Unification Church and suggested that the
heightened scrutiny should consist of the type of intermediate scrutiny embodied in
cases such as Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Greater Minneapolis Association of Evangelicals at 15, Lar-
son (No. 80-1666), available at 1981 WL 390118 (arguing for stricter scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause); Brief of Amicus Curiae the Center for Law and Religious
Freedom of the Christian Legal Society at 7-8, Larson (No. 80-1666), available at 1981
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in part, that the Act was unconstitutional for preferring some reli-
gions over others.108
Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for a five-justice majority in
Larson.109  Brennan began the opinion by disposing of the thresh-
old standing question, stating that it was logically inconsistent for
Minnesota to argue that the Unification Church was not a religious
organization subject to the Act since it had attempted to enforce
the Act’s religious organization provisions against the Church in
the district court.110
The opinion immediately turned to a brief summary of de-
nominational preference precedents, beginning and ending with
the two most frequently quoted passages from Larson:  “The clear-
est command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious de-
nomination cannot be officially preferred over another[,]”111 and
“[i]n short, when we are presented with a state law granting a de-
nominational preference, our precedents demand that we treat the
law as suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its con-
stitutionality.”112  However, as the earliest commentator on Larson
noted,113 the precedents cited by the Court in support of the strict
scrutiny rule were not framed as cases where one religion was be-
ing preferred over another, nor did any of them involve the appli-
cation of strict scrutiny.114
WL 390114 (also arguing for stricter Equal Protection scrutiny).  Unfortunately, I was
unable to obtain transcripts of the oral arguments in Larson in order to determine to
what degree the question of heightened scrutiny was discussed.
108 See Brief of Amici Curiae General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, et al. at
11, Larson (No. 80-1666), available at 1981 WL 390115 (“[T]his religious gerrymander
violates the Establishment Clause . . . .”); Brief of Amicus Curiae Americans United
for Separation of Church and State Fund, Inc. at 19, Larson (No. 80-1666), available at
1981 WL 390113 (“The error committed by the Minnesota legislature, however, was
the failure to observe the principle of neutrality when granting the exemption.”);
Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, et al. at 4, Larson (No. 80-1666),
available at 1981 WL 390110 (focusing on entanglement prong of Lemon, but agreeing
that the Act “has the improper purpose and effect of favoring exempted religions
over unexempted religions.”); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Jewish Congress at 8,
Larson (No. 80-1666), available at 1981 WL 390112 (“The exemption from regulation
of religious organizations which raise more than half of their funds from members
violates this neutrality principle, and therefore violates the Establishment Clause.”).
109 456 U.S. 228 (1982).  He was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and
Stevens.  Justice Stevens also wrote a concurring opinion, in which he “agree[d] with
the Court’s resolution of the Establishment Clause issue,” Larson, 456 U.S. at 258
(Stevens, J., concurring), and focused on the standing argument.
110 See id. at 240. See also Evans, supra note 18, at 367.
111 Id. at 244. See also Evans, supra note 18, at 367.
112 Id. at 246.
113 Evans, supra note 18.
114 See id. at 377.  The Court cited Everson v. Bd.  of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), Zorach
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In the course of the discussion, the Court acknowledged that
“[t]he constitutional prohibition of denominational preferences is
inextricably connected with the continuing vitality of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause[,]”115 helping to explain why it was, for the first time,
applying the traditional Free Exercise test of strict scrutiny under
the Establishment Clause.116
After announcing the new test, the Court held that the Act
“clearly grants denominational preferences of the sort consistently
and firmly deprecated in our precedents[,]”117 relegating a discus-
sion of Minnesota’s Gillette v. United States defense to a footnote.118
In the footnote, the Court states that the case at bar is different
than the situation in Gillette and other disparate impact cases for
two reasons.  First, the exemption provision of the Act “is not sim-
ply a facially neutral statute, the provisions of which happen to
have a ‘disparate impact’ upon different religious organizations.
On the contrary, [the exemption] makes explicit and deliberate
distinctions between different religious organizations.”119  Second,
the Court held that Gillette itself was inapplicable because the dis-
tinction there was made between religious beliefs, in contrast to
the Act’s distinction on the basis of religious affiliation.120
The Court immediately proceeded to consider whether Min-
nesota had satisfied the strict scrutiny inquiry.  The Court began by
noting that, although the Act as a whole clearly furthered a com-
pelling interest, the particular exemption for only some religious
groups had to be examined independently to determine if it was
closely fitted to further that compelling interest.121  The Court
quickly disposed of Minnesota’s purported justification for the re-
ligious classification, stating that there was no evidence that an or-
ganization would be better supervised simply because it received
more funds from members than nonmembers.122  Additionally,
and, in contrast, the Court found the need for public disclosure
more plausibly rises with the absolute amount of contributions an
organization receives, as opposed to the proportion of funds it re-
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), and Abington
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982).
115 Larson, 456 U.S. at 245.
116 See infra Section V.D.
117 Larson, 456 U.S. at 246.
118 See id. at 246 n.23.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 248. See also Evans, supra note 18, at 369.
122 See Larson, 456 U.S. at 249-50. See also Evans, supra note 18, at 367.
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ceives from members compared to nonmembers.123
The final portion of the Court’s opinion is clearly dicta.  The
Court stated that the Lemon test is “intended to apply to laws afford-
ing a uniform benefit to all religions, and not to provisions, like
[the Act] that discriminate among religions[,]”124 but it proceeded
to apply the Lemon test anyway.  In the course of invalidating the
Act under Lemon’s entanglement prong, the Court noted that the
Act had politicized religion in the Minnesota Legislature because
the legislative history demonstrated that individual legislators had
crafted the law narrowly and purposefully to include groups like
the Unification Church while excluding more mainstream relig-
ious groups like the Catholic Church.125
In two separate opinions, four justices dissented in Larson.  All
four dissenters joined Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion that
argued the Unification Church lacked standing.126  Justice White,
joined by Justice Rehnquist, issued a dissenting opinion on the
merits of the Establishment Clause issue.127  He agreed with Minne-
sota that neither the Supreme Court nor the court of appeals
should have entertained arguments regarding the Legislature’s
motivation in enacting the exemption, since the district court had
received no evidence or made any findings of fact on the issue.128
Related to this argument was his criticism of the majority’s ruling
that the exemption constituted a denominational preference.
White noted that:
The rule itself . . . names no churches or denominations that are
entitled to or denied the exemption.  It neither qualifies nor
disqualifies a church based on the kind or variety of its religious
belief.  Some religions will qualify and some will not, but this
depends on the source of their contributions, not on their
brand of religion.129
Because the subjective motivation of the Minnesota Legisla-
ture was not properly before the Court, and because the face of the
123 See Larson, 456 U.S. at 251. See also Evans, supra note 18, at 369-70.
124 Larson, 456 U.S. at 252 (footnote omitted).
125 See id. at 253-255. See also Evans, supra note 18, at 370-71; Neal Devins, Religious
Symbols and the Establishment Clause, 27 J. CHURCH & STATE 19, 22 (1985) (“Apparently,
this legislation was drafted in order to impose reporting requirements on so-called
‘cult religions’ such as the Unification Church and the Hare Krishnas.”).  Today, Min-
nesota provides an exemption from charitable regulation for all religious groups that
are tax-exempt under Federal law. See MINN. STAT. § 309.515(b) (2003).
126 Larson, 456 U.S. at 264-72.
127 Id. at 258-63 (White, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 260-61 (White, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 261 (White, J., dissenting).
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statute itself did not make explicit distinctions between religions,
White concluded a violation of the Establishment Clause had not
been demonstrated.130 In a strict sense then, White did not explic-
itly disagree with the idea of a compelling interest test for denomi-
national preferences; however, he did not clearly support the idea
either.  Instead, his dissent was premised on a belief that the plain-
tiffs had not even demonstrated the existence of a denominational
preference.
Taken squarely at face value, and without the benefit of gloss
by subsequent courts and commentators, Larson seems to stand for
a simple proposition: laws creating denominational preferences
are subject to strict scrutiny.  Further, from the Court’s discussion
of the statute, one could deduce that statutes can create denomina-
tional preferences without explicitly naming different religions for
different treatment and that discrimination on the basis of relig-
ious affiliation incurs strict scrutiny whereas discrimination on the
basis of religious belief still incurs only the Gillette neutral, secular
purpose test.
However, even this apparently clear formulation of the Larson
test creates enormous ambiguity.131  For example, does “prefer-
ence” include only tangible benefits or does it also include more
subtle forms of preference such as endorsement and religious sym-
bolism?  By denominational preference, does the Court mean only
distinctions between sects within a particular religion (such as
Christianity), distinctions between religions (such as Christianity
and Judaism), or even between different kinds of religions (such as
theistic and non-theistic religions)?  When does a law create a de-
nominational preference?  We know at one extreme that com-
pletely secular laws having a disparate impact on religions are not
included, and at the other extreme laws explicitly classifying ac-
cording to religious affiliation are included, but there is a broad
middle ground between the two extremes that is left unclear.
What is the role of legislative purpose in finding a denominational
preference?  Can it simply be inferred from the statute itself or
must there be independent evidence of invidious intent?  Why
would discrimination on the basis of religious belief be more ac-
ceptable than discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation?
And finally, is this all simply another way of stating the already-
developed rule under the Equal Protection Clause132 that laws dis-
130 Id. at 261-62 (White, J., dissenting).
131 This fact was recognized just a year after Larson. See Evans, supra note 18, at 378.
132 See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam) (stating that
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criminating on the basis of religion are suspect?  The following sec-
tion discusses how subsequent Supreme Court decisions have
interpreted Larson, while subsequent sections attempt to provide
answers to some of these questions.
B. Subsequent Construction of Larson
In the more than twenty years since Larson was decided, the
Supreme Court has cited it in just nineteen cases,133 and five of
those citations were made in cases not involving the Establishment
or Free Exercise Clauses.134
Just two weeks after the Larson decision was released, the Su-
preme Court, without opinion, vacated a decision of the Supreme
Court of Washington and remanded it for consideration in light of
Larson.135  In the vacated decision, Washington’s highest court had
upheld the constitutionality of a statute that required public em-
ployees who objected to union membership because of their relig-
ious beliefs to belong to a religious organization in order to gain
an exemption from paying union dues.136  In a strict sense, the
challenged statute did not create a denominational preference
since it did not favor some religious organizations over others; in-
stead, it created a preference for persons belonging to any relig-
ious organization over persons who were unaffiliated with a
religious group, even though believers in each category could be
sincerely opposed to union membership.137  The Court’s motiva-
classifications that “trammel[] fundamental personal rights” or are “drawn upon in-
herently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage” receive higher scru-
tiny under the Equal Protection Clauses).
133 See Westlaw KeyCite for Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (examined De-
cember 13, 2004).
134 See Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115, 1117 (1994) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Larson for proposition that if Equal Protection Clauses prohibit peremp-
tory challenges on basis of race and gender, they logically prohibit peremptory
challenges on basis of religion); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 161
(1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same); Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985) (citing
Larson for proposition that questions of constitutionality should not be discussed un-
less unavoidable); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (citing
Larson for the proposition that First Amendment rights include rights to associate
with others in pursuit of a wide variety of religious ends); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel.
Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 944 n.2 (1982) (citing Larson in relation to standing issue).
135 See Grant v. Wash. Pub. Employment Relations Comm’n, 456 U.S. 955 (1982)
(mem.), vacating Grant v. Spellman, 635 P.2d 1071 (Wash. 1981).
136 See Grant, 635 P.2d 1071 (Wash. 1981).
137 This point assumes that the concept of “denomination” necessarily includes an
associational element.  To illustrate, an aggregate of isolated and unrelated individu-
als who coincidentally share the same religious status do not constitute a denomina-
tion.  This is especially true when the very status they have in common is lack of
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tion for using Larson to vacate and remand Washington is not obvi-
ous.138 However, it is likely that the Court chose Larson because the
decision discusses the fact that it is unacceptable to discriminate on
the basis of religious affiliation.139
The next term, in Marsh v. Chambers,140 the Court upheld Ne-
braska’s custom of having a paid chaplain begin each legislative
session with a prayer.  There was conflicting evidence on whether
the practice actually preferred one religion over another.  For ex-
ample, the same Presbyterian minister had been chaplain for six-
teen years,141 and some of his prayers explicitly invoked Jesus
Christ142 until a Jewish legislator complained about the content of
the prayers.143  On the other hand, the chaplain had made a sin-
cere effort to write nondenominational prayers since receiving the
complaint144 and the weight of the evidence indicated he was cho-
sen for his personal abilities, not because of his religion.145
The parties paid some attention to the question of whether
the Larson strict scrutiny test applied,146 but the bulk of their briefs
membership in a religious association. See infra Section V.A. (discussion of different
definitions of “denomination”).
138 On remand, the Washington Supreme Court opined that the statement of re-
mand in light of Larson was “delphic at best” and had elicited “varied and contradic-
tory” opinions from the parties on how it should proceed.  Grant v. Spellman, 664
P.2d 1227, 1229 (Wash. 1983).  Accordingly, the Washington court decided to simply
reinterpret the statute to allow the exemptions rather than “go astray in the uncer-
tainties of the First Amendment and engender further confusion . . . .” Id. at 1229.  In
contrast, two of the court’s justices argued that “[Larson] presents a sound and easily
manageable basis upon which to decide this case.” Id. at 1231 (Williams, C.J., concur-
ring).  One difficulty in interpreting the remand is that the Washington Supreme
Court had already applied a compelling interest test (under the Free Exercise Clause)
in the original case. See Grant, 635 P.2d at 1075.  However, if Larson simply stands for
the proposition that strict scrutiny applies to denominational preferences, the most
the Washington Supreme Court could do is apply the exact same test as before; as-
suming that “compelling state interests” are not more difficult to demonstrate under
the Establishment Clause than under the Free Exercise Clause, the results should be
the same.  Several years later, the Sixth Circuit relied on Larson to invalidate a provi-
sion of the National Labor Relations Act that was almost identical to the provision at
issue in Grant.  See Wilson v. NLRB, 920 F.2d 1282 (6th Cir. 1990).
139 See Larson, 456 U.S. at 246 n.23.
140 463 U.S. 783 (1983). See Robert M. Slovek, Note, Legislative Prayer and the Estab-
lishment Clause: An Exception to the Traditional Analysis, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 157
(1983).
141 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794.
142 Id. at 794 n.14.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 See id. at 793.
146 Compare Brief for the Respondent at 49-50, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983) (No. 82-23), available at LEXIS 1982 U.S. Briefs 23 (citing Larson and stating
that “Nebraska has dramatically advanced religion, Christianity in general, and the
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was devoted to arguing about whether Nebraska’s paid chaplaincy
was constitutional under Lemon.147  The majority opinion uphold-
ing Nebraska’s practice made no mention of either Larson or
Lemon,148 yet it is clear the majority did not feel a denominational
preference was at issue: “The content of the prayer is not of con-
cern to judges where, as here, there is no indication that the prayer
opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one,
or to disparage any other, faith or belief.”149
Although it was not the focus of his dissent, Justice Brennan
did note that “the appointment of a single chaplain for 16 years,
and the evident impossibility of a Buddhist monk or Sioux Indian
religious worker being appointed for a similar period might well
justify application of the Larson test”150 and that if strict scrutiny
were applied, the Nebraska practice would fail.151  Similarly, Justice
Stevens argued in dissent that designating a member of a single
religion as a state’s only chaplain for several years constituted a
denominational preference.152
The majority’s decision not to cite or discuss Larson is not con-
Presbyterian Church in particular” in course of discussion of Lemon effects prong),
with Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 4, Marsh (No. 82-23), available at LEXIS 1982 U.S.
Briefs 23 (arguing that Larson does not apply because chaplaincy legislation is con-
cerned only with procuring the personal service of an individual, and makes no relig-
ious classifications).  Two amicus briefs made clear arguments for applying Larson. See
Brief of Amicus Curiae Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith at 8, Marsh (No. 82-
23), available at LEXIS 1982 U.S. Briefs 23; Brief of Amicus Curiae American Jewish
Congress at 16, 45-47 Marsh (No. 82-23), available at LEXIS 1982 U.S. Briefs 23.
147 See Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 16-17, 21-26, Marsh (No. 82-23), available at
LEXIS 1982 U.S. Briefs 23; Brief for the Respondent at 21-54, Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783 (1983) (No. 82-23), available at LEXIS 1982 U.S. Briefs 23; Petitioners’ Reply
Brief, supra note 146.
148 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court makes no pre-
tense of subjecting Nebraska’s practice of legislative prayer to any of the formal ‘tests’
that have traditionally structured our inquiry under the Establishment Clause.”).
Ironically, the United States, as amicus curiae, argued that the Court’s decision not to
apply Lemon in Larson had precedential value when deciding to apply neither case in
Marsh, and that a simple “historical analysis” was sufficient. See Brief of the United
States at 13, Marsh (No. 82-23), available at LEXIS 1982 U.S. Briefs 23.  This approach
was adopted by the majority. See, e.g., Bannon, supra note 26, at 506 (“The [Marsh]
majority, however, ignored the Lemon and [Larson] tests because the Nebraska chap-
laincy practice represented a two-hundred-year old historical practice, an historical
practice as old as the Nation.”).
149 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95.
150 Id. at 801 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
151 Id.
152 Id. at 823 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Prayers may be said by a Catholic priest in
the Massachusetts Legislature and by a Presbyterian minister in the Nebraska legisla-
ture, but I would not expect to find a Jehovah’s Witness or a disciple of Mary Baker
Eddy or the Reverend Moon serving as the official chaplain in any state legislature.”).
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clusive as to the meaning of the test, since the majority resolved
conflicting evidence to find that there simply was no denomina-
tional preference.  Indeed, the Court’s decision to ignore Lemon
demonstrates an intent to depart from standard Establishment
Clause doctrine.153  However, the decision does clarify that, in the
Court’s mind, practices that prefer theism over non-theism do not
indicate a “denominational preference.”  Less certain, but implied
in the decision is that practices that promote a generalized, non-
sectarian Christianity do not constitute a denominational prefer-
ence.  This second interpretation of Marsh received support in the
Court’s next major Establishment Clause case, Lynch v. Donnelly.154
Lynch embroiled the Supreme Court in a passionate debate as
to whether a city’s Christmas nativity scene violated the Constitu-
tion.155  The First Circuit, relying principally on Larson, held that
“the City’s ownership and use of the nativity scene is an act which
discriminates between Christian and non-Christian religions”156
and found that it failed the strict scrutiny test.157  On appeal, liti-
gants and amici devoted considerable space to whether Larson ap-
plied.  The city, for example, argued that a denominational
preference did not exist because the city had a secular purpose in
erecting the nativity scene.158  In contrast, the plaintiffs argued that
153 Indeed, Marsh has come to stand for some sort of vaguely defined “historical
validation test.” See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 7, at 913 (stating that Marsh is based on
the claim that “the establishment clause does not forbid anything analogous to a prac-
tice that was common in 1791,” and criticizing that claim).
154 465 U.S. 668 (1984). See generally Zarrow, supra note 17 at 495-98; Gordon, supra
note 38; Devins, supra note 125; Hersman, supra note 17.
155 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (“The creche . . . consists of the
traditional figures, including the Infant Jesus, Mary and Joseph, angels, shepherds,
kings, and animals . . . .”).
156 Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029, 1034 (1st Cir. 1982), rev’d, 465 U.S. 668
(1984).
157 Id. at 1035 (“If one is unable to demonstrate any legitimate purpose or interest,
it is hardly necessary to inquire whether a compelling purpose or interest can be
shown.”).  The potential for Larson to invalidate public displays of religious symbols
was noted by Evans, supra note 18, at 381 n.121 (“Local governments would do well to
take note of the Larson decision.  Religiously oriented Christmas observances, includ-
ing governmental promotion of Christianity by erecting a creche, necessarily discrimi-
nate against those who do not share a belief in Christ.”).
158 See Brief of the Petitioners at 13-14, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (No.
82-1256), available at LEXIS 1982 U.S. Briefs 1256.  Unlike Larson and Marsh, the clear
weight of amici in Lynch supported the constitutionality of the challenged practice;
most of them argued forcefully against application of a strict scrutiny test. See Brief of
the Amicus Curiae Coalition for Religious Liberty, et al. at 5-6, Lynch (No. 82-1256),
available at LEXIS 1982 U.S. Briefs 1256 (arguing that Larson should not apply be-
cause if the strict scrutiny test were taken seriously, most ceremonial deisms would be
invalidated); Brief of the United States at 10-11, Lynch (No. 82-1256), available at
LEXIS 1982 U.S. Briefs 1256 (stating that the creche is acknowledgment of religion,
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the creche signified the city’s official preference for Christianity
over all other religions.159
In an increasingly familiar 5-4 split, a majority of the Supreme
Court applied the Lemon test and found the city’s display of the
nativity scene to be permissible under Establishment Clause princi-
ples.  The Court stated that, even if the nativity scene did promote
a particular faith, it did so only in an “indirect, remote, and inci-
dental”160 fashion.  The majority dispensed with the Larson contro-
versy in a footnote, stating that “[i]t is correct that we require strict
scrutiny of a statute or practice patently discriminatory on its face.
But we are unable to see this display, or any part of it, as explicitly
discriminatory in the sense contemplated in Larson.”161
In an important and frequently-cited concurring opinion, Jus-
tice O’Connor first suggested that the “effects” prong of Lemon for-
mally include a “reasonable observer” endorsement element.162
Further, O’Connor suggested in a footnote that the Larson denom-
inational preferences test could also be assimilated into the en-
dorsement inquiry.163  Under her version of the Larson test,
“[p]lain intentional discrimination should give rise to a presump-
tion, which may be overcome by a showing of compelling purpose
and close fit, that the challenged government conduct constitutes
an endorsement of the favored religion or a disapproval of the dis-
favored.”164  Justice Brennan’s dissent for the four-judge minority
focused on Lemon, but he too referenced Larson in a footnote, stat-
not a denominational preference); Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington Legal Founda-
tion at 3-5, Lynch (No. 82-1256), available at LEXIS 1982 U.S. Briefs 1256 (arguing that
creche has neither a discriminatory purpose nor effect); Brief of Amicus Curiae Legal
Foundation of America at 3-4, Lynch (No. 82-1256), available at LEXIS 1982 U.S. Briefs
1256 (stating that Larson test applies only to cases of purposeful, invidious
discrimination).
159 See Brief of the Respondents at 40, Lynch (No. 82-1256), available at LEXIS 1982
U.S. Briefs 1256 (arguing that the cre`che creates a denominational preference be-
cause it “celebrates the doctrinal beliefs of those who embrace the Divinity of Jesus
Christ.”).  Two amici supported application of the Larson denominational preferences
test.  Brief of Amici Curiae Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, et al. at 13-15,
Lynch (No. 82-1256), available at LEXIS 1982 U.S. Briefs 1256; Brief of Amici Curiae
American Jewish Committee, et al. at 10, Lynch (No. 82-1256), available at LEXIS 1982
U.S. Briefs 1256.
160 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683 (citations omitted).
161 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 n.13. See also Hersman, supra note 17, at 135 n.19 (“The
Supreme Court reversed Lynch based in part on the Lemon test and in part on an
historical analysis.  The Court did not apply strict scrutiny because it did not view the
Christmas display as discriminatory.”) (citation omitted).
162 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691-92 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
163 See id. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
164 Id.
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ing that he agreed with the Court of Appeals that the nativity scene
failed the strict scrutiny test.165
Both Lynch and Marsh were decided primarily by judges who
had dissented in Larson,166 and each case implies that the strict
scrutiny test does not apply to a preference for generalized Christi-
anity or theism over other religions.  Both cases embody a trend to
dismiss allegations of denominational preference with little or no
substantive analysis.167  However, the majority opinion in Lynch did
make clear that the Larson strict scrutiny test had become a settled
part of Establishment Clause doctrine, even if available only in par-
ticular and limited situations—statutes or practices “explicitly” or
“patently” discriminatory.168
The next time the Court examined a Larson-based claim,169 it
165 See id. at 704 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166 Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, White, and Chief Justice Burger dissented in Lar-
son but were in the majority in both Marsh and Lynch.
167 See Hersman, supra note 17, at 158 (“[T]he Court should have at least explained
its position more clearly for future actions.”); Devins, supra note 125, at 44 (“[The
Court’s] comment concerning the inapplicability of Larson is opaque.”).
168 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 n.13.  Indeed, the statement by the majority that Lar-
son applies to discriminatory practices as well as discriminatory statutes could even be
seen as an extension of the denominational preferences test. See, e.g., Powell v.
United States, 945 F.2d 374, 378 (11th Cir. 1991) (“The Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment prohibits denominational preferences, including those created by
discriminatory or selective application of a facially neutral statute against a particular
denomination.”).
169 There was at least one case during this time period when Larson was raised by
the parties but not addressed by the Court.  In 1985, the Court struck down legislation
requiring employees to be given a day off work on their Sabbath. See Estate of Thorn-
ton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985).  The Supreme Court did not discuss or even cite
to Larson, even though the issue was raised in the litigants’ briefs. Compare Brief for
Caldor, Inc. at 32-33, Thornton (No. 83-1158), available at 1984 WL 566033 (arguing
that the Connecticut law favors certain “traditional” religions over others that do not
have a Sabbath requirement) with Brief of Amicus Curiae United States Supporting
Petitioner at 19, Thornton (No. 83-1158), available at 1984 WL 566038 (arguing that
law is “equally available to adherents of any of a multitude of religious denominations
and sects”).  Although the majority did not discuss denominational preferences, Jus-
tice O’Connor did note that “The statute singles out Sabbath observers for special
and, as the Court concludes, absolute protection without according similar accommo-
dation to ethical religious beliefs and practices of other private employees . . . .” Thor-
ton, 472 U.S. at 711 (O’Connor, J., concurring), thus implying that some sort of
denominational preference may have been present. See also Abner S. Greene, Kiryas
Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 77-78 (1996) (stating that in
Thornton, “[o]ne argument that the Justices did not raise is that the [Sabbath] law
comes close to advancing the majority’s religion, since Christians would be the pri-
mary beneficiaries of the law.”).  There are seven minor occasions, not discussed in
the text of this Article, when members of the Supreme Court have cited Larson in the
context of a religious freedom claim.  In his dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38 (1985), then-Justice Rehnquist cited Larson three times in his discussion
of why he believed the Lemon test should be dispensed with. See id. at 107 n.6, 108,
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was asked to invalidate a Federal statute that exempted religious
employers from the reach of another Federal statute prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of an employee’s religious belief or af-
filiation.170  Pressed only half-heartedly by the plaintiffs,171 the
Court easily disposed of the Larson claim by reiterating that strict
scrutiny applies only to laws or practices preferring some religions
over others, not to laws preferring religion over non-religion.172
Because the Federal statute provided an exemption to all religious
employers, Larson was simply inapplicable.
A much stronger claim was presented two years later in Her-
nandez v. Commissioner.173  At issue was the deductibility of payments
112 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  In Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 598 n.5 (1988), the
Court upheld legislation that provided grants to sex education providers only if they
did not advocate abortion.  The Court noted that a Larson claim was raised and subse-
quently rejected in the district court below, but that this ruling had not been chal-
lenged on appeal. See Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1557 (D. D.C. 1987)
(“Although the prohibition against advocating abortion, like opposition to war in any
form [in Gillette], may coincide or conflict with religious precepts, that fact does not
require the Court to analyze the [statute] pursuant to a strict scrutiny analysis.”), rev’d
on other grounds, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).  In the fractured and confusing set of opinions
for County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (invalidating creche display
but upholding menorah display), a majority twice cited Larson in the course of an
argument against Justice Kennedy’s “coercion” test. Id. at 605, 609.  Interestingly
enough, although the plaintiffs in Allegheny did not argue for application of the Larson
denominational preferences test, one of the defendants argued that Larson required
the presence of a menorah in addition to the creche. See Brief for Petitioner Chabad
at 8, Allegheny (No. 88-90), available at LEXIS 1988 U.S. Briefs 90.  In his concurring
opinion in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), Justice Souter cited Larson for the
proposition that “[s]ince Everson, we have consistently held the Clause applicable no
less to governmental acts favoring religion generally than to acts favoring one religion
over others.” Id. at 610 (Souter, J., concurring). Most recently, in Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), Chief Justice Rehnquist again referenced Larson in
the course of an argument against applying Lemon. Id. at 320 (Rehnquist, C.J., dis-
senting).  Finally, the Court has cited Larson twice in Free Exercise Clause cases, one
of which clearly dealt with a law intended to burden a particular religious sect. See
Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)
(citing Larson for proposition that government may not impose special disabilities on
basis of religious affiliation); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 560 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (applying strict scrutiny under Free Exercise
Clause for law intentionally burdening one denomination).  The relationship be-
tween denominational neutrality under the Free Exercise Clause and the Larson strict
scrutiny test is discussed infra Section V.D.
170 See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987).  The plaintiff was a Mormon employee of a
Church-owned gymnasium, and was fired for failure to obtain a “temple recommend.”
171 See Brief for Appellees at 33 n.35, Presiding Bishop (No. 86-179), available at 1987
WL 864785 (arguing that exemption favors traditional or formally organized groups
over newer religious organizations).
172 See Presiding Bishop, 483 U.S. at 338-39.
173 490 U.S. 680 (1989). See generally Alison H. Eaton, Comment, Can the IRS Over-
rule the Supreme Court?, 45 EMORY L.J. 987 (1996).
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made by members to the Church of Scientology for “auditing,” a
form of one-on-one religious counseling and training.174  Because
the Church of Scientology requires mandatory, fixed payments in a
commercial manner for auditing, the Internal Revenue Service de-
termined that auditing involved a quid pro quo transaction and
therefore denied individual Scientologists a tax exemption for au-
diting under the general exemption for charitable gifts or
donations.175
Members of the Church vigorously pressed a denominational
preferences claim on appeal.176  They argued that Larson had been
violated in two ways: first, because the exemption on its face fa-
vored religions that raised funds without imposing fixed costs for
religious services,177 and second, because the IRS had a long-stand-
ing administrative practice of allowing deductions for similar fund-
raising customs by other, more traditional, religious groups.178
In denying the exemption, a majority of the Supreme Court
held that the exemption statute itself “easily passes constitutional
muster”179 under Larson because it does not facially distinguish be-
tween religious sects and makes quid pro quo transactions by any
religious entity non-deductible.180  The Court addressed the
Scientologists’ second claim in a different portion of the opinion
than the Establishment Clause analysis, characterizing it as an “ad-
ministrative consistency” claim,181 and holding that the record was
not sufficiently developed to make such a finding.182  In dissent,
174 See Brief for the Petitioners at 4-5, Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue,
490 U.S. 680 (1989) (No. 87-963), available at 1987 WL 880088 (describing auditing).
175 See Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 686 (1989).  In other words, the statutory
question was whether payments for religious services should be considered purchases
or donations.  Only under the latter interpretation would the Scientologists receive a
tax deduction for auditing.
176 See Brief for Petitioners, at 14-31, 41-42, 46-48, Hernandez, 490 U.S. 680, available
at 1987 WL 880088 (detailing history of IRS rulings regarding quid pro quo transac-
tions for other religious groups and alleging existence of a denominational prefer-
ence). See also Brief for the Respondent at 38-47, Hernandez (Nos. 87-963; 87-1616),
available at 1988 WL 1025636 (responding).
177 See Brief for Petitioners, at 47, Hernandez, 490 U.S. 680, available at 1987 WL
880088 (“By artificially elevating the form over the religious nature of such payments,
the courts below establish a tax preference for religious groups that do not specify
membership costs”).
178 See id. at 48 (“fixed payments that yield such benefits to adherents of other faiths
traditionally have been deductible . . . [t]he IRS here attempts to discriminate among
religions.”).
179 Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 695.
180 See id. at 695-96.
181 Id. at 702.
182 See id. at 703.
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Justices O’Connor and Scalia took issue with this move.  They dis-
cussed at length several religious quid pro quo arrangements that
the IRS had found deductible in the past,183 and argued that:
[T]he Court cannot abjure its responsibility to address serious
constitutional problems by converting a violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause into an ‘administrative consistency argument’
with an inadequate record.  It has chosen to ignore both long-
standing, clearly articulated IRS practice, and the failure of re-
spondent to offer any cogent, neutral explanation for the IRS’
refusal to apply this practice to the Church of Scientology.  In-
stead, the Court has pretended that whatever errors in applica-
tion the IRS has committed are hidden from its gaze and will, in
any event, be rectified in due time.184
O’Connor and Scalia concluded that “[j]ust as the Minnesota
statute at issue in [Larson] discriminated against the Unification
Church, the IRS’ application of the quid pro quo standard here—
and only here—discriminates against the Church of
Scientology.”185
Hernandez, decided almost fifteen years ago, was the last time a
majority of the United States Supreme Court explicitly addressed
the application of the Larson strict scrutiny test, and unfortunately
it did not help resolve the test’s many ambiguities.  However, Her-
nandez was not the last time the Court examined a law that arguably
constituted a denominational preference under the Establishment
Clause.
In a 1994 case commonly referred to as Kiryas Joel,186 the Court
183 See id. at 710 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing deductibility for “a Christian
who obtains the pew of his or her choice by paying a rental fee, a Jew who gains
entrance to High Holy Day services by purchasing a ticket, a Mormon who makes the
fixed payment necessary for a temple recommend, or a Catholic who pays a Mass
stipend”).
184 Id. at 713 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
185 Id.  Interestingly, the IRS later retreated from its position and allowed Scientolo-
gists to deduct auditing payments after subsequent litigation threatened to establish
such a record of administrative inconsistency. See Powell v. United States, 945 F.2d
374, 378 (11th Cir. 1991) (reversing dismissal of complaint for determination on the
merits, and noting that “[t]he Establishment Clause . . . prohibits denominational
preferences, including those created by discriminatory or selective application of a
facially neutral statute against a particular denomination.”). See also Eaton, supra note
173, at 1015 (“The arguable conclusion to be drawn from the IRS’s retreat is that the
IRS feared defeat on the administrative inconsistency claim and hoped to sidestep the
issue by rendering the claim moot.  If the IRS had litigated the issue in Powell and lost,
it would have been forced to apply the law consistently to all religious organiza-
tions.”).  The Ninth Circuit later relied on Larson to cast doubt on the constitutional-
ity of the IRS’s decision to allow deductions for Scientologists. See Sklar v. Comm’r,
282 F.3d 610, 618-20 (9th Cir. 2002).
186 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).  The purpose behind
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examined a special act of the New York Legislature that granted a
village comprised exclusively of members of one religious sect the
power to create and administer a school district with public funds.
Because the Chief Judge of New York’s highest court had relied on
Larson to find the statute unconstitutional in her concurring opin-
ion,187 the litigants devoted some space to the issue in their briefs
and oral argument to the Supreme Court.188
Justice Souter wrote both a majority and a plurality opinion
for the decision invalidating the special legislation.  In the majority
opinion, the Court struck down the law on a broad theory of relig-
ious neutrality.189  Although it did not clearly apply the Larson com-
pelling interest test,190 Larson and denominational equality were
clearly at work.  The Court first cited Larson for the proposition
that “the benefit [of the law] flows only to a single sect, but aiding
the act was to allow members of the Satmar Hasidim, followers of a strict form of
Judaism, to provide educational services to their handicapped children in an environ-
ment where the children would not be exposed to ridicule because of their distinctive
modes of clothing, culture, and religion. Id. at 692-93. See generally Ira C. Lupu, Un-
covering the Village of Kiryas Joel, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 104 (1996); LEVY, supra note 1, at
251-56; Greene, supra note 169; Susan E. Acklin, Note, Board of Education of Kiryas
Joel Village School District v. Grumet: Another Snub for Lemon Draws it Nearer to its
Probable Demise, 41 LOY. L. REV. 43 (1995); Wheeler, supra note 39.
187 See Grumet v. Board of Educ., 618 N.E.2d 94, 102 (N.Y. 1993) (Kaye, C.J., con-
curring) (“The law at issue is precisely the sort of legislation that should be strictly
scrutinized, because it provides a particular religious sect with an extraordinary bene-
fit: its own public school system.”).  Kaye argued that “[a] forbidden denominational
preference can result from a grant of benefits to one religious group as readily as
discrimination among sects . . . .” Id. at 104.  She found that although the statute had
a compelling purpose, a less restrictive alternative existed. Id. at 105, 106.
188 See Brief for Petitioner Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. at 46-47, Kiryas
Joel (No. 93-517), available at 1994 WL 761249 (arguing that the law is not discrimina-
tory because no other religious sects in New York are similarly situated); Reply Brief
for Petitioner Bd. of Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist. at 7-10, Kiryas Joel
(No. 93-39), available at 1994 WL 86652 (arguing that Larson does not apply because
law is not patently discriminatory); Reply Brief for Petitioner Att’y Gen. of New York
at 8-9, Kiryas Joel (No. 93-39), available at 1994 WL 90591 (arguing that although law
was aimed at particular group, it did not further or prefer that group’s religious
views).  Oral argument also included some discussion of denominational neutrality.
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 20-22, Kiryas Joel (No. 93-517), available at 1994 WL
665057.
189 See Wheeler, supra note 39, at 223.  The plurality decision was focused on the
principle from Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982), that government
cannot delegate political authority to religious groups. See Greene, supra note 169, at
18-20.
190 See Wheeler, supra note 39, at 245-46 (arguing the Court should have used Lar-
son). See also Children’s Healthcare is a Legal Duty v. Vladeck, 938 F. Supp. 1466,
1473 (D. Minn. 1996), reh’g en banc denied, Children’s Healthcare v. DeParle, No. 98-
3521MNMI 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 22333 (8th Cir. Aug. 29, 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S.
957 (2001) (noting that “Larson was cited but strict scrutiny was not explicitly
applied”).
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this single, small religious group causes no less a constitutional
problem than would follow from aiding a sect with more members
as a whole . . .”191 and again for the proposition that “Petitioners’
proposed accommodation singles out a particular religious sect for
special treatment, and whatever the limits of permissible legislative
accommodations may be, it is clear that neutrality as among reli-
gions must be honored.”192  Indeed, the majority found that one of
the principal problems with the special legislation was that there
was no guarantee that other religious sects in a similar situation
would receive the same treatment in the future.193  In a concurring
opinion, Justice O’Connor, one of the members of the majority,
stated that “it seems dangerous to validate what appears to [be] a
clear religious preference.”194  In contrast, Justice Kennedy, also
concurring, argued that the law was indeed invalid for being drawn
along religious lines, but that denominational neutrality was not
yet an issue since there was no evidence that other similarly situ-
ated religious groups had been denied accommodation.195
Kiryas Joel, although not an unambiguous case, seems to indi-
cate that a law simply favoring one religion by name creates an
unconstitutional denominational preference, even in the absence
of evidence that other religious groups have been denied the same
treatment.196  However, the failure to clearly apply a strict scrutiny
test further calls into question the continued validity of the Larson
test.
Kiryas Joel was the last time the Court was faced with a question
of denominational neutrality under the Establishment Clause.  Re-
lying solely on Supreme Court statements on Larson, we can glean
only a few indications as to its meaning.  First, the test simply does
not apply to legislation favoring religion over nonreligion; discrim-
ination between religions is required.  Second, the promotion of
191 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 705.
192 Id. at 706-07 (citations and footnote omitted).
193 See Greene, supra note 169, at 5 (“[T]he Court expressed the concern that other
similarly situated groups would not receive the same benefit as the Satmars . . .”);
Wheeler, supra note 39, at 229 (“The case-specific nature of the statute—which sin-
gled out Kiryas Joel by name—meant that neither the courts nor any other reviewing
authority could ensure that the legislature did not assist one religion at the expense of
another, or promote religion over irreligion.”).
194 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 717 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
195 See id. at 722 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  After Kiryas Joel, the New York Legisla-
ture tried twice more to craft constitutional legislation for the Satmar Hasidim, but
both statutes were struck down. See also Grumet v. Pataki, 720 N.E.2d 66 (N.Y. 1999),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 946 (1999).
196 Such sect-specific exemptions are surprisingly common, and many lower courts
have used Larson to analyze their constitutionality. See infra Section VI.
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theism or a generalized version of Christianity will rarely, if ever, be
found in practice (as opposed to in formal doctrine) to elicit strict
scrutiny.  Third, government conduct, as well as legislation, fall
under Larson’s reach.  Finally, a law naming one religion for a ben-
efit implicitly discriminates against religions not named, and prob-
ably implicates some form of heightened scrutiny.
However, in the twenty years since the Larson test was an-
nounced, its strict scrutiny test has never been used to strike down
challenged legislation, nor has the Court ever explicitly held that
the test was even applicable.  Although Justice O’Connor has noted
that “it is surely unusual to judge the vitality of a constitutional doc-
trine by looking to the win-loss record of the plaintiffs who happen
to come before us . . .”197 a “test” that is never applicable is proba-
bly better regarded as an artifact or an aberration than an impor-
tant part of Supreme Court jurisprudence.  On the other hand,
one might also argue that the Court’s reluctance to apply Larson
may simply stem from the paucity of cases where a legislature has
explicitly preferred one religious denomination over another.  To
help resolve whether Larson still has any independent force, the
next section departs from the narrow confines of Supreme Court
statements on the case, and analyzes it in a much broader way
through comparisons with the Free Exercise Clause, the Equal Pro-
tection Clauses, the Lemon test, and more.
V. ANALYSIS
This section takes a much broader view in attempting to un-
derstand the meaning of Larson.  Thus, the discussion in this sec-
tion is necessarily more tentative and theoretical.
A. Meaning of “Denomination”
As the essential difference between the Larson test and the
more general Lemon approach is that the former applies only to
discrimination between denominations, an important threshold
step is determining the meaning of “denomination” for the pur-
poses of the test.  This inquiry is related to, but distinct from, the
much-debated question of what constitutes a “religion” or “relig-
ious” belief under the First Amendment.198  Although apparently
197 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 897
(1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
198 Perhaps the best place to start is Lee J. Strang, The Meaning of “Religion” in the
First Amendment, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 181 (2002). See also TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-6 at
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obvious, the definition of denomination is not as settled as it may
seem, and is in fact capable of both narrow and broad readings.
In the narrowest reading of “denomination,” the word refers
to different sects of Christianity, not to different sects of other reli-
gions.199  A more expansive view defines the word as including
competing sects within non-Christian religions,200 while an even
more expansive view uses the word “denomination” as simply a syn-
onym for “religion.”201  Perhaps the broadest reading would apply
the word to kinds of religions, such as theistic and non-theistic, or
monotheistic and polytheistic.202
The first reading, limiting Larson to discrimination between
Christian sects, could conceivably receive support from a strict
originalist reading of the purposes of the Establishment Clause.203
1179-88; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 6, § 17.6 at 1212-14; Trucios-Haynes, supra
note 17, at 201-03 nn.212-16.
199 Under this definition of “denomination,” Larson would apply to discrimination
between Catholics and Protestants, but not to discrimination between the Orthodox
and Reformed branches of Judaism. See, e.g., 1 FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW INT’L DICTION-
ARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 343 (1995) (“A body of Christians having a distinguish-
ing name; sect.”); 1 ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF RELIGION 1027 (1979) (“Both the
underlying idea and denominations themselves are particularly a feature of Christian-
ity in the U.S. . . . .”).
200 Under this definition, “denomination” would include discrimination by sects
within any religion, but probably not to discrimination between religions themselves
(such as discrimination between Christianity and Judaism). See, e.g., THE CONCISE OX-
FORD DICTIONARY OF WORLD RELIGIONS 152 (2000) (“A religious group within a major
religion, having the same faith and organization.”); WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COL-
LEGIATE DICTIONARY 339 (1991) (“a religious organization uniting in a single legal and
administrative body a number of local congregations”); THE NEW LEXICON WEBSTER’S
ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 256 (Deluxe ed. 1990) (“a relig-
ious sect”); 4 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 458-59 (2d ed. 1989) (“a religious sect
or body having a common faith and organization, and designated by a distinctive
name”).
201 See, e.g., DICTIONARY OF RELIGIOUS TERMS 147 (1967) (“A group with certain be-
liefs or principles.”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 391(5th ed. 1979) (“A society of indi-
viduals known by the same name, usually a religious society.”).
202 See, e.g., Richard H. Jones, “In God We Trust” and the Establishment Clause, 31 J.
CHURCH & ST. 381, 404 (1989) (“The God-references [on coins and in the Pledge of
Allegiance] discriminate on their face between nontheistic and theistic religious tradi-
tions.  Thus, the Larson strict scrutiny test should apply.”). Cf. Larkin v. Grendel’s
Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 120 n.3 (1982) (“Appellee argues that the statute unconstitu-
tionally differentiates between theistic and nontheistic religions.  We need not reach
that issue . . . and thereby avoid serious constitutional questions that would arise con-
cerning a statute that distinguishes between religions on the basis of commitment to
belief in a divinity.”).
203 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 589 (1989) (“Sectarian
differences among various Christian denominations were central to the origins of our
Republic.”); CORD, supra note 7, at 161 (“Reflecting the religious reality of the early
days of the Republic, Leo Pfeffer indicates in Church, State, and Freedom that the ‘num-
ber of professed non-Christians’ was minute.  Consequently, because of this Christian
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Non-legal sources tend to support the second reading that “de-
nomination” includes sects within non-Christian faiths, but is not
just another word for “religion.”204  The third interpretation, that
Larson could apply to discrimination between entire religions, is
probably the one that the Supreme Court would take if forced to
define “denomination” for the purposes of strict scrutiny; after all,
it’s hard to imagine a majority of the Court saying that a statute
explicitly discriminating between Islam and Judaism receives less
scrutiny than a statute explicitly discriminating between Baptists
and Methodists.  This interpretation receives support from Larson
itself (the only case actually applying strict scrutiny for a denomina-
tional preference), where the religious group involved was the Uni-
fication Church, an organization on the outer-most periphery of
Christianity and not really a sect of any larger religion.205
The fourth interpretation, that different types of religions
should be included in the term “denomination,” could be pre-
mised on the virtually unassailable proposition that government
preference for religion in a manner it has historically considered
“nondiscriminatory” often infringes upon the beliefs of many non-
traditional religious groups.206  Although the Court could conceiv-
universality, federal funds to aid Christian-affiliated schools were, in those days, not
unconstitutional unless the Federal Government discriminated against some Chris-
tian denominations or sects and thus put one version of the Christian faith in a pre-
ferred status contrary to the First Amendment.”) (quoting LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH,
STATE, AND FREEDOM 141-42 (rev. ed. 1967)).
204 See supra note 200.  One source aptly summarizes the debate over applying the
word “denomination” to the sects of different faiths. FRANK S. MEAD, HANDBOOK OF
DENOMINATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 31 (rev. by Samuel S. Hill, 10th ed. 1995) (“De-
nomination here is a catchall term.  Judaism does not use the term, nor is it a felicitous
expression to the Orthodox, the Old Catholics, and many Evangelicals.  This term
may simply be the best available label for the wide-ranging treatment of religious bod-
ies in America that this book aims to provide.”).
205 See MELTON, supra note 81.  There are several examples where the Court has
used the word “religion” instead of “denomination” when discussing Larson. See, e.g.,
Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 605 (citing Larson for proposition that “Whatever else the
Establishment Clause may mean . . . it certainly means at the very least that govern-
ment may not demonstrate a preference for one particular sect or creed (including a
preference for Christianity over other religions).”) (emphasis added) (citations omit-
ted); Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 695 (1989) (“Larson teaches that, when it is
claimed that a denominational preference exists, the initial inquiry is whether the law
facially differentiates among religions.”) (emphasis added); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 706-07 (1994) (citing Larson for proposition that “whatever
the limits of permissible legislative accommodations may be, it is clear that neutrality
as among religions must be honored.”) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  Of
course, it may not be wise to place too much weight on the Court’s use of the word
“religion” in the place of “denomination” in these passages, as the distinction between
the two terms was not an issue in the cases.
206 For example, the word “God” in the Pledge of Allegiance or on coins may not
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ably apply Larson to a statute explicitly drawing distinctions be-
tween “theistic” and “non-theistic” religious organizations, the
strict scrutiny test has not been used, and probably will not be
used, in the context of a generalized promotion of certain religious
concepts in this area.207
B. Belief/Affiliation Distinction
As mentioned previously,208 the Court in Larson stated that the
lesser “neutral, secular” test of the Gillette conscientious objector
case did not apply because Gillette involved discrimination on the
basis of individual religious belief, whereas the statute in Larson mer-
ited strict scrutiny because it created discrimination on the basis of
religious affiliation.209  As one commentator has noted:
This distinction is, however, too absurd to be taken seriously.
Surely the Court would find that a law discriminated between
religions—despite the fact that it concerned only individual be-
lief rather than group identification—if the law restricted a gov-
ernment benefit to those who had accepted Jesus Christ as their
savior.  Obviously, some beliefs are so closely associated with par-
ticular religions or sects that discrimination on the basis of those
beliefs is equivalent to discrimination on the basis of religious
coincide with religious organizations who believe in a Goddess, or in multiple gods.
Similarly, “nondenominational prayer” may violate the tenets of religious organiza-
tions that do not believe in the efficacy of prayer. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 202, at
405 (“There are no generic religious symbols or ceremonies common to all reli-
gions.”); Laycock, supra note 7, at 920 (“For the issues that are most controversial,
nonpreferential aid is plainly impossible.  No prayer is neutral among all faiths . . . .
Government-sponsored religious symbols or ceremonies . . . are inherently preferen-
tial.”).  This includes the broad category of so-called “ceremonial deisms.” See generally
Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
2083 (1996); Jeremy Patrick, Ceremonial Deisms, HUMANIST, Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 42.
207 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 n.13 (1984) (holding that display of Chris-
tian creche is not “explicitly discriminatory in the sense contemplated in Larson.”),
discussed supra Section IV.B., is probably the best example of the reluctance to apply
Larson in this context.  Some of the subsequent school prayer cases, such as Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) and Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000)
are also good examples, as is the legislative prayer in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983).
208 See supra text accompanying notes 117-20.
209 See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 n.23 (1982). See also Jesse H. Choper,
The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent Developments, 27
WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 960 (1985-1986) (“The Court [in Gillette] reasoned that this
law did not discriminate on the basis of religious affiliation.  That is true.  The Selec-
tive Service Act did not say, for example, that Quakers are exempt and Catholics are
not.  The law, however, did plainly discriminate on the basis of the kind of religious
beliefs one had—beliefs opposed to all wars rather than beliefs opposed only to un-
just wars.”).
2005] STRICT SCRUTINY 91
group identity.210
The problem with the Court’s statement in Larson is that the
law challenged in Gillette was not simply a secular law that had an
unintentional disparate impact on certain religious groups;211 nor
was it a law, like those exempting sacramental wine from Prohibi-
tion, or religious headgear from military dress rules, that involve a
distinction only between persons who hold a relevant religious be-
lief and those that do not.212  In the absence of some kind of justifi-
cation or further content, it may be wise to disregard this per se
belief/affiliation distinction as simply a hasty rationalization that
the Court did not think through carefully.
C. Meaning of “Preference”
Another ambiguity surrounding the Larson test is determining
what forms of government action constitute a “preference” for a
particular denomination.  In other words, should “preference” be
read broadly to include government action that falls under the
general rubric of “endorsement,” or should it be read in a more
narrow fashion to include only government action that creates tan-
gible benefits or burdens?  The former interpretation would ex-
pand the possible scope of the Larson test to cases involving
government-sponsored religious symbolism or non-coercive
proselytization, while the latter would restrict the test to cases
where the government conditions funding or services on the basis
of denominational affiliation.213
210 Williams & Williams, supra note 8, at 893. See also TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-7 at
1192 n.25 (“Unless religious organizations are to receive greater protection than indi-
vidual adherents, it is difficult to understand the relevance of the difference.”).
211 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.30 (1983) (up-
holding federal law forbidding government funded private schools from discriminat-
ing on the basis of race, even though the rule had a disparate impact on religious
segregationists); Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1557 (D. D.C. 1987) (uphold-
ing a statute restricting ability of federal grantees from advocating abortion, even
though it had a disparate impact on certain religious groups), rev’d on other grounds,
487 U.S. 589 (1988).
212 See Williams & Williams, supra note 8, at 893-94 (“The second, related ambiguity
concerns laws that extend special treatment to those who engage in a practice or
activity in which not all religions participate.  All religions that engage in the relevant
activity receive the benefit, so there is no Larson-type discrimination between reli-
gions.  The potential discrimination arises because religions that do not engage in the
relevant activity receive no analogous benefit.”); Anastasia P. Winslow, Sacred Stan-
dards: Honoring the Establishment Clause in Protecting Native American Sacred Sites, 38 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1291, 1334 (1996) (discussing belief/affiliation distinction).
213 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 202, at 404 (discussing Court’s refusal to apply Larson
in Lynch and stating that “Perhaps the justices did not think the Larson test should
apply to symbolism but only to regulatory action.”). Larson involved the imposition of
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An argument for the restrictive view could be premised on the
notion that the original purpose of the Establishment Clause was to
forbid compulsory taxation for the financial support of particular
denominations,214 and that therefore the Court’s most stringent
test in the area should apply only to the framers’ area of greatest
concern: actual coercion.  Although this view might command two
or three members of the Court, a stable majority tends to equate
“preference” with “endorsement” and goes to great lengths to note
the evils of even non-denominational endorsement.215  As a doctri-
nal matter, then, the Larson test probably applies to non-tangible
government action that endorses a particular denomination, even
if in practice such a law would be received more generously than
one creating tangible consequences.216
costly and burdensome record-keeping and reporting requirements on certain de-
nominations. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
214 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 856 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“[T]he most important reason for according special treatment to direct money
grants is that this form of aid falls precariously close to the original object of the
Establishment Clause’s prohibition.”); LEVY, supra note 1, at 78 (“Spending tax mon-
ies for religion was an old and controversial issue that inspired considerable thought;
other aids for religion had not been the subject of controversy in the colonies or
states and tended to be taken for granted.”); Laycock, supra note 7, at 878-79 (“The
Framers’ generation thought about establishment clause issues in the context of fi-
nancial aid; they did not think about those issues in connection with nonfinancial
aid.”).
215 See, e.g., Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 605-06
(1989) (“[T]he term ‘endorsement’ long has been another way of defining a forbid-
den ‘preference’ for a particular sect . . .”); id. at 593 (discussing history of Court’s use
of “endorsement,” “preference,” “favoritism,” and “promotion” interchangeably).  Im-
portantly, these statements in Allegheny County were made in the course of rejecting
Justice Kennedy’s proposed “coercion” test, which would have limited the reach of
the Establishment Clause to cases where the government compelled, directly or indi-
rectly, religious conduct or belief. See id. at 660-663 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). See generally Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element
of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 934-936 (1986); Douglas Laycock, “Nonco-
ercive” Support for Religion: Another False Claim About the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U.
L. REV. 37 (1991).  O’Connor’s frequently quoted statement on the evils of endorse-
ment, that “government cannot endorse the religious practices and beliefs of some
citizens without sending a clear message to nonadherents that they are outsiders or
less than full members of the political community[,]” Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 627
(O’Connor, J., concurring), can be read in conjunction with an earlier statement she
made equating “endorsement” with “preference” for the purposes of Larson. See Alle-
gheny, 492 U.S. at 605-06.
216 After this section was written, a panel of the Eighth Circuit reached a very differ-
ent conclusion.  In ACLU Neb. Found. v. Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2004), the
court by a 2-1 margin struck down the erection of a Ten Commandments monument
in a public park.  The monument was alleged to create a denominational preference
in two different ways.  First, city officials were forced to choose between several differ-
ent and highly contested versions of the language of the Ten Commandments, and
second, the monument preferred Christianity and Judaism over other religions since
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D. Relation to Free Exercise
Between 1963 and 1990, the Supreme Court applied a strict
scrutiny test to government action challenged under the Free Exer-
cise Clause.217  A leading scholar on religious freedom summed up
the doctrine:
If the plaintiff can show that a law or governmental practice in-
hibits the exercise of his religious beliefs, the burden shifts to
it contained Stars of David and the Greek letters for “Christ.”  Judge Bly, writing for
the court, argued that “[m]ost courts having applied Larson did so when the chal-
lenged government action created a practical, tangible benefit or burden for adher-
ents of a specific religion[,]” while on the other hand, “[w]here government action
amounts to no more than religious expression, however, courts have applied Lemon.”
Id. at 1033.  The first part of this novel argument relied on the fact that Larson itself
and two other lower court decisions applying Larson involved tangible benefits, while
the second part relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lynch and lower court
decisions involving other Ten Commandments monuments.  As discussed more gen-
erally in the text, this argument has the virtue of acknowledging that historically, coer-
cion through bequest or withdrawal of tangible benefits (whether through actual
force of the criminal law or more indirectly through tax subsidies, for example) has
been seen as far more problematic than endorsement.  It is also an interpretation that
explains Lynch’s cryptic language regarding Larson without the more unsavory inter-
pretation that the Court thinks discrimination between theism and non-theism, or
nondenominational Christianity and all other religions, does not merit strict scrutiny.
However, the Supreme Court has on several occasions rejected the notion that coer-
cion is an element of an Establishment Clause violation, and Judge Bly did not quote
or refer to the language cited supra note 215 equating “endorsement” with “prefer-
ence.”  His view that Larson does not apply to non-tangible preferences would lead to
the position that a state-erected billboard saying “Got Religion?” is no more or less
problematic than a state-erected billboard saying “Jesus Saves, Attend a Protestant
Church Today!” or “Beware the Papist Conspiracy!”  It may also be worth noting that
the other Ten Commandments cases Judge Bly cites did not involve arguments that
Larson was violated, as the litigants did not focus on the specifically denominational
aspects of the monuments.  Finally, the Court in Lynch seemed more interested in
establishing that any endorsement by the creche was “indirect, remote, and inciden-
tal” because of its context among other secular displays. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 683 (1984).  It did not clearly suggest that in a different context a much
more proselytizing or clearly preferential display would be immune from Larson.
Judge Arnold, also in the majority in Plattsmouth, focused his concurrence solely on
the fact that he thought Larson was applicable.  He stated, “I believe this monument is
also invalid under the Larson test.  The words on the monument clearly prefer Christi-
anity and Judaism[,]” id. at 1043, but unfortunately he did not discuss Judge Bly’s
tangible/intangible distinction.  Although perhaps problematic, Judge Bly’s position
is not necessarily untenable, and this issue will probably remain unsettled until either
the Supreme Court or a majority of the circuits are faced with cases involving clear
government endorsement of specific denominations through non-tangible means.  In
the interests of disclosure, I note that I acted as counsel for a party in Plattsmouth
before the district court and was responsible for addressing the Larson question.  In
the most recent development, on April 6, 2004, the full Eighth Circuit vacated the
panel decision and ordered a hearing en banc.
217 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Employment Div., Dep’t of Human
Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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the government to demonstrate that the law or practice is neces-
sary to the accomplishment of some important (or “compel-
ling”) secular objective and that it is the least restrictive means
of achieving that objective.  If the plaintiff meets his burden and
the government does not, the plaintiff is entitled to exemption
from the law or practice at issue.218
Prevailing wisdom was that the Free Exercise Clause applied to
burdens on religious belief, while the Establishment Clause applied
to benefits to religious belief.219
The Court’s 1982 Larson decision was seen as blurring the line
between Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence in
two important respects.  First, the Court imported, for the first
time, a Free Exercise strict scrutiny test into an Establishment
Clause analysis.220  Second, the Court used this new Establishment
Clause test to examine government conduct that burdened the relig-
ious belief of the plaintiff.221  Indeed, the Court in Larson itself rec-
ognized the decision’s relation to Free Exercise Clause values:
The constitutional prohibition of denominational preferences is
inextricably connected with the continuing vitality of the Free
Exercise Clause . . . .  Madison’s vision—freedom for all religion
being guaranteed by free competition between religions—natu-
rally assumed that every denomination would be equally at lib-
erty to exercise and propagate its beliefs.  But such equality
would be impossible in an atmosphere of official denomina-
tional preference.  Free exercise thus can be guaranteed only
when legislators—and voters—are required to accord to their
own religions the very same treatment given to small, new, or
unpopular denominations.222
In 1990’s Employment Division v. Smith,223 however, the Su-
218 McConnell, supra note 6, at 1416-17 (footnotes omitted).  Additionally, a plain-
tiff in a Free Exercise challenge must demonstrate the sincerity of his or her religious
belief. See TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-7 at 1191 n.19.
219 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993)
(applying Free Exercise Clause instead of Establishment Clause because government
was attempting to disfavor religion as opposed to preferring it); CHOPER, supra note 5,
at 13-14 (discussing distinction); Evans, supra note 18, at 361 n.11 (“Since the religion
clauses necessarily overlap, the traditional method used to distinguish between those
factual scenarios that required analysis under the establishment clause and free exer-
cise clause was that the former proved useful in adjudicating aid to religions while the
latter was best suited to discern impermissible burdens on religions.”).
220 See Evans, supra note 18, at 368 n.51; Zarrow, supra note 17, at 489 n.74.
221 See Evans, supra note 18, at 361 n.11.
222 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982). See also Conkle, supra note 8, at 7
(“The requirement of denominational equality also has played a powerful role in the
Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.”).
223 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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preme Court reformulated its Free Exercise Clause doctrine to
hold that strict scrutiny applies only when the challenged law or
conduct is not “neutral” or “generally applicable.”224  Although the
meaning of the “neutral and generally applicable” test is not clear,
it appears to apply to laws and practices that target religion for
special burdens or that discriminate between religious
denominations.225
If both the Free Exercise Clause and the Larson test apply
equally to benefits and burdens, apply to discrimination between
denominations, and require application of a strict scrutiny test, is
there any real difference between them?  In other words, should
Larson simply be removed from Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence and integrated into Free Exercise Clause doctrine?  For ex-
ample, respected commentator Jesse Choper has stated that:
Larson should be seen as a free exercise clause decision parading
in an establishment clause disguise.  This criticism of the basis
for the Court’s ruling is not just caused by a sense of aesthetics;
rather, it further illustrates the confusion that the Court has cre-
ated with respect to establishment clause and free exercise
224 Id. at 886 n.3 (“Our conclusion [is] that generally applicable, religion-neutral
laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be
justified by a compelling governmental interest”).  Laws that are challenged on the
basis of the Free Exercise Clause and another constitutional provision may still receive
strict scrutiny. See id. at 881. See generally Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revision-
ism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990). Whether this was more a
change in doctrine than in practice has been questioned by many scholars. See supra
note 26 (collecting articles).  In both Smith and Lukumi Babalu, a subsequent Free
Exercise case, the Court cited Larson as embodying a parallel principle under the
Establishment Clause. See supra note 169.
225 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543 (1993) (sug-
gesting that generally applicable tests are violated by laws that “in a selective manner
impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief”); id. at 557 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“In my view, the defect of lack of neutrality applies primarily to those
laws that by their terms impose disabilities on the basis of religion . . . whereas the defect
of lack of general applicability applies primarily to those laws which, though neutral
in their terms, through their design, construction, or enforcement target the prac-
tices of a particular religion for discriminatory treatment.”) (citations omitted);
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 546 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Contrary to
the Court’s holding in [Smith], however, the Free Exercise Clause is not simply an
antidiscrimination principle that protects only against those laws that single out relig-
ious practice for unfavorable treatment.”); Laycock, supra note 40, at 1009 (“The only
remaining protection [after Smith] is that provided by formal neutrality; religious con-
duct cannot be singled out for facially discriminatory regulation.”); Conkle, supra
note 8, at 12 (“Smith essentially reduced the Free Exercise Clause to a prohibition on
deliberate governmental discrimination against religion”).  Interestingly, the Court’s
discussion of the plaintiffs’ Free Exercise Clause challenge in Gillette v. United States,
401 U.S. 437, 461-2 (1971) suggested that discrimination was not particularly relevant
in adjudicating the question of whether a compelling interest justified the burden on
religion. See supra note 75.
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clause doctrine.226
Although it’s tempting to view Larson as simply another ex-
pression of the Free Exercise Clause’s “neutral and generally appli-
cable” test, a closer analysis shows two differences between them
that could potentially affect the outcome of a case.  First, Free Ex-
ercise Clause doctrine generally requires a finding that the plaintiff
has a “sincere” religious belief, a requirement that does not for-
mally exist under the Establishment Clause.227  Second, the Free
Exercise Clause requires the plaintiff to show that the legislation or
conduct has “significantly burdened” his or her religious belief, a
standard more restrictive than standing under the Establishment
Clause which may be premised solely on one’s status as a tax-
payer.228  At least theoretically then, each test could apply to con-
duct that the other does not—the “neutral and generally
applicable” test could apply to conduct targeting all religious belief
but not discriminating between denominations (thus placing it
outside the scope of Larson), while Larson could apply to statutes
providing aid to particular denominations without directly burden-
ing anyone’s religion (placing it outside the scope of the Free Exer-
cise Clause).  Still, these circumstances are probably not likely to
occur with extreme frequency, making the Larson test and the
“neutral and generally applicable” test largely equivalent.
A distinct question that implicates free exercise values, though
not the Free Exercise Clause itself, is the extent to which govern-
ment may voluntarily “accommodate” religion by granting exemp-
tions from neutral and generally applicable laws.229  The question
implicates Larson because several of these accommodations are
226 Choper, supra note 209, at 958.  Choper further suggests that the Court’s stan-
dard Establishment Clause analysis is not suited to discerning discrimination between
religions, and should be reserved for aid to religion generally.
227 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-7 at 1191 n.19 (“The Court [in Larson] did not
explicitly consider the other elements of the free exercise test . . . [including] whether
soliciting from nonmembers was based on a sincerely held religious belief.  Thus, it
appears that a religious adherent may face no hurdles (beyond standing) in challeng-
ing a statute that overtly discriminates among religions; an adherent who challenges a
statute that is not overtly discriminatory, in contrast, must demonstrate his or her own
sincerity.”) (citation omitted).
228 See, e.g., Eaton, supra note 173, at 1024-29 (discussing Establishment Clause
standing); Bill Latham, Note, Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State: Taxpayer Standing and the Establishment Clause, 34 BAY-
LOR L. REV. 748 (1982) (same).
229 See generally Anjali Sakaria, Note, Worshipping Substantive Equality over Formal Neu-
trality: Applying the Endorsement Test to Sect-Specific Legislative Accommodations, 37 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 483 (2002); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The
Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991).
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sect-specific, limiting their application to particular named denom-
inations.  For example, until a few years ago a Federal statute gave
Christian Scientists special exemptions from Medicare and Medi-
caid regulations.230  Similarly, many states have “kosher-fraud” laws,
which regulate the food preparation practices of certain restau-
rants and grocery stores according to the beliefs of a particular
named denomination, Orthodox Judaism.231  Challenges to stat-
utes like these have so far arisen only in lower courts, and thus will
be dealt with in more detail in the next section, but the point here
is that these practices represent what is in many cases the paradig-
matic “denominational preferences” case—especially since the stat-
ute struck down in Larson itself did not even name any
denominations, and divided religious organizations according to
an apparently secular criterion.  Because the Smith decision se-
verely limited the ability of courts to grant free exercise exemp-
tions, the pressure placed on legislatures to voluntarily
accommodate the needs of religious minorities has only increased.
The Supreme Court has frequently noted that a legislature’s
ability to accommodate religion is “by no means co-extensive with
the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.”232  In
other words, there is an area of legislative discretion between the
accommodation that the Free Exercise Clause mandates and the
limitations on religious preference imposed by the Establishment
Clause—a so-called “zone of permissible accommodation . . . .”233
At the same time, however, a legislature cannot simply invoke the
magic word “accommodation” to shield itself from all Establish-
ment Clause scrutiny.234  The legislation must operate to lift discern-
ible burdens235 and is still subject to the fundamental principle that
it cannot discriminate between denominations.236
230 See supra Section VI.A.
231 See supra Section VI.B.
232 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
233 See TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-4 at 1169.
234 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (“The principle that government
may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamental
limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause.”).
235 See Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 613 n.59
(1989) (“[A]n accommodation of religion, in order to be permitted under the Estab-
lishment Clause, must lift ‘an identifiable burden on the exercise of religion.’”)
(quoting Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 US. 327, 348 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (emphasis omit-
ted); LEVY, supra note 1, at 160 (“Generally, the justices agree that accommodation
means relieving religion of an improper burden that restricts its free exercise.”).
236 See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 706-07 (1994) (“whatever
the limits of permissible legislative accommodations may be, it is clear that neutrality
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The only time the Court has examined a purported legislative
accommodation that was suspected of enacting a denominational
preference was Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet.237  In
Kiryas Joel, the Court struck down a statute creating a separate
school district for a village populated entirely by members of a sin-
gle religious sect.238  One of the primary grounds for the Court’s
decision was the fear that similar “accommodations” might not be
granted to other religious sects in the future.239  A majority held
that even accommodations must be denominationally neutral,240
while Justice O’Connor explored the issue in more depth, stating
that:
Accommodations may thus justify treating those who share this
belief differently from those who do not; but they do not justify
discriminations based on sect.  A state law prohibiting the con-
sumption of alcohol may exempt sacramental wines, but it may
not exempt sacramental wine use by Catholics, but not by Jews.
A draft law may exempt conscientious objectors, but it may not
exempt conscientious objectors whose objections are based on
theistic belief (such as Quakers) as opposed to nontheistic belief
(such as Buddhists) or atheistic belief.  The Constitution per-
mits ‘nondiscriminatory religious practice exemption[s],’ not sec-
tarian ones.241
The doctrine that voluntary government accommodation of
religion must still respect the general prohibition against denomi-
national preference seems well-settled in the caselaw.242  Respected
academics have questioned this rule, arguing that sect-specific ex-
emptions “reflect . . . not biased favoritism, but rather an act of
as among religions must be honored.”) (citations omitted); TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-7
at 1199 (“The problem of denominationally discriminatory accommodation may be
posed as readily when government selectively lifts some (but not all) of the burdens
on religion it has imposed, as when it selectively mandates some private accommoda-
tions.”); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 6, § 17.6 at 1215 (“An exemption from [a]
law of general applicability . . . that only provided an exemption to members of a
specific religion or an exemption only for persons who held religious beliefs would
establish a denominational preference that would violate the establishment clause.”).
237 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (discussed in greater depth supra Section IV.B.).
238 See id.
239 See supra p. 134.
240 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 709.
241 Id. at 715-16 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations and internal quotations
omitted).
242 See Sakaria, supra note 229, at 496 (“[T]he [Supreme] Court has . . . interpreted
the denominational neutrality principle to mean that a legislature may not grant an
accommodation to a specific religious group or sect.”).  An excellent and clear analy-
sis of some of the issues discussed in this section can be found in Alan E. Brownstein,
Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion,
Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (1990).
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respect by a majority group toward a minority group.”243  Propo-
nents of this view suggest that exemptions for particular minority
sects generally do not create denominational favoritism because
mainstream religions already have their religious preferences
embedded in both custom and legislation.244  Other supporters
analogize sect-specific exemptions to race or sex-based affirmative
action.245
The question is difficult, and in many cases could probably be
avoided by careful statutory drafting that limits exemptions by ref-
erence to the relevant religious belief at issue, instead of by refer-
ence to denominational affiliation.246  For example, consider a
243 Greene, supra note 169, at 82. See also TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-7 at 1193 (“One
can say with greater confidence that Larson’s neutrality principle does not extend to
cases where the state’s denominational line is based on free exercise values.  For
where a burden falls with special weight on some religions, religious classifications are
called for; religion blindness would produce only an illusory and hostile neutrality.”).
244 See CHOPER, supra note 5, at 119-20 (discussing views of Marc S. Galanter in
Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 217, 291);
McConnell, supra note 6, at 1419-20 (“The proponents of exemption . . . observe that
powerful and influential religions will usually receive adequate protection in the polit-
ical arena.  One rarely sees laws that force mainstream Protestants to violate their
consciences.”) (footnote omitted); Sakaria, supra note 229, at 500 (“The views of a
majority religious group are not likely to conflict with most laws since a democratically
elected legislature is unlikely to pass a law that curtails the religious exercise of a large
constituency.”).  One commentator is skeptical of the usefulness of this majority-mi-
nority dichotomy. See Lupu, supra note 186, at 117 (“In many instances, the question
of who is benefitting from religious accommodations and who is bearing its costs de-
fies simple majority-minority characterization.  First, by what standards will religious
groupings be made?  Are all Christians to be lumped together, all Jews to be viewed as
having common interests, all Muslims to be seen as equally benefitting from accom-
modations of the religious customs of some?  If the groupings are more refined than
this, taking into account sects and subgroups, there will rarely be a religious majority
in any political community.”).
245 See, e.g., David E. Steinberg, Religious Exemptions as Affirmative Action, 40 EMORY
L.J. 77 (1991); Greene, supra note 169, at 58-59. See also Jesse H. Choper, Religion and
Race Under the Constitution: Similarities and Differences, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 491 (1994).
The analogy to affirmative action is an interesting one, as the Court currently applies
strict scrutiny to racial affirmative action. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003).  If accommodating religious minorities is akin to affirmative action, the Larson
strict scrutiny test may well be the appropriate one to apply—the question would then
become whether the government could provide a compelling interest the exemption
serves, perhaps one analogous to the compelling interests of diversity or rectifying
past discrimination articulated in the affirmative action context. See generally Stephen
E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential But Unanalyzed Term in Consti-
tutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917 (1988).
246 See Paulsen, supra note 41, at 345 n.152 (“In utilizing either religion-conscious
remedies or race-conscious remedies, a legislature uses a suspicious basis of classifica-
tion to attain what may well be permissible objectives.  It is always preferable to at-
tempt to obtain these objectives with classifications that do not use explicitly racial or
religious criteria . . . .”).
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hypothetical high school cafeteria policy allowing members of a
particular Hindu sect, and only those Hindus, to eat special, more
expensive, meat-free meals.  Such a sect-specific accommodation
could be revised to apply to any students with sincere religious be-
liefs against eating meat (such as Catholics during Lent, for exam-
ple).  It is possible, of course, that this would broaden the scope of
the exemption to such a degree that it simply becomes untenable.
As commentators suggest, an important corollary of this prin-
ciple is that most legislative accommodation of religious belief will
prefer some minority religions over other minority religions, rather
than prefer minority religions over mainstream religions.247  The
Larson test would presumably prevent a legislature from discrimi-
nating between minority religions in the granting of exemptions
unless a compelling reason existed.248  Moreover, if a sect-specific
exemption were found invalid under Larson, the court applying the
test could theoretically either abolish the exemption altogether, or
broaden it to include religious groups currently not included.249
Thus, despite the fears of some commentators, a requirement of
denominational neutrality is not necessarily baneful to religious
freedom for sects and cults—it could be a powerful tool for unpop-
ular minority religious groups to gain exemptions currently pro-
vided only to well-regarded ones.
The political and academic debate over sect-specific exemp-
tions will certainly continue, and the Supreme Court will likely be
faced with this issue again in the near future.  Although govern-
ment efforts to accommodate religion are made in the spirit of free
247 See Lupu, supra note 186, at 118 (“[I]t is entirely possible that a minority will
bear the brunt of the costs of accommodating another minority.”).
248 The difficult issue here is determining when discrimination is present.  If a stat-
ute names a particular denomination, the decision is easy; in other cases it may be
much harder.  A statute that is formally neutral, such as one that provides exemptions
for religious headgear in the military, might effectually discriminate against denomi-
nations that seek exemptions for other religious clothing besides headgear.  Greene,
supra note 169, at 79.  One response is that the government need not accommodate
all religious belief in order to constitutionally accommodate some religious belief; that
is, “underinclusive” legislation is permissible in this context, at least until a denomina-
tion “similarly situated” to the denomination currently receiving the exemption seeks
the same benefit. See id. at 60-63.  The question of when denominations are “similarly
situated” for the purposes of receiving an exemption arises occasionally in the lower
courts, and is discussed infra note 256 and accompanying text.
249 See, e.g., Developments, supra note 8, at 1693 (“[I]n theory, equal treatment of
religions can be achieved either by making aid available on a facially neutral basis to
all religions or by refusing aid to any religion.”).  An example of this distinction arose
in Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d 1458, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1989), where the question was whether
federal exemptions from criminal liability for religious peyote use should be extended
to religious marijuana use.
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exercise and may be limited to prevent establishment, a third con-
stitutional principle often comes into play: equal protection.
E. Relation to Equal Protection
Courts and scholars have long noted that the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses embody an equal protection princi-
ple—that religions should not be treated differently by the govern-
ment without good reason.250  However, a neglected thread of
jurisprudence posits the related but slightly different principle that
the Constitution’s independent guarantees of equal protection251
limit a government’s ability to affect religion, regardless of the ap-
plication of the Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses.252  For ex-
250 The most famous statement was made in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Walz v.
Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970), where he stated, “Neutrality in its application
requires an equal protection mode of analysis.  The court must survey meticulously
the circumstances of governmental categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerry-
manders.” Michael A. Paulsen discusses Justice Harlan’s remark and states that
“[e]ver since, the Court has tended to use the language of the equal protection clause
in religion cases, but not its substantive methodology.  Harlan’s insight has been used
as a rhetorical flourish for opinions, but never developed into a framework for decid-
ing cases.”  Paulsen, supra note 41, at 327 (footnotes omitted). See also Christopher
Parker, A Constitutional Examination of the Federal Exemptions for Native American Religious
Peyote Use, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 89, 101 (2002) (“It seems that, despite their separate
constitutional origins, the Establishment and the Equal Protection Clauses are related
to one another in this context [of applying denominational neutrality].”); Steffey,
supra note 22, at 904 (“Doctrinally, the restraining principles of religious equality have
close analogs to equal protection principles that enforce a norm of racial equality.”).
But see McConnell, supra note 40, at 146 (criticizing “doctrinal imperialism” of at-
tempts to use equal protection analysis in Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
The Larson denominational preferences test is often viewed as incorporating equal
protection principles. See Jones, supra note 202, at 404 (“the Supreme Court [in Lar-
son] employed an equal protection ‘strict scrutiny’ test.”); Winslow, supra note 212, at
1303 (“[T]he Court [in Larson] invoked an equal protection test in applying the Es-
tablishment Clause . . .”); Jeffrey T. Lawrence, Note, The War on Drugs and Denomina-
tional Preferences: Farewell to Strict Scrutiny Analysis, 1990 BYU L. REV. 1083, 1087 (1990)
(“Larson’s strict scrutiny analysis for laws that prefer one denomination over another
is a logical extension of Justice Harlan’s equal protection/neutrality analysis in
Walz.”).
251 The Constitution’s independent guarantees of equal protection are located in
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that the Fifth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause incorporates equal protection guarantees). See, e.g., NOWAK
& ROTUNDA, supra note 6, § 14.1 at 569 (“the standards for validity under the due
process and equal protection clauses are identical.”).
252 See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 324 (1972) (per curiam) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (“Presumably prison officials are not obligated to provide facilities for any
particular denominational services within a prison, although once they undertake to
provide them for some they must make only such reasonable distinctions as may sur-
vive analysis under the Equal Protection Clause.”); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163, 188 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that discriminating on the basis of
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ample, the Court has unanimously held in dicta that religion is a
suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause, and that therefore
government legislation that classifies according to religious criteria
merits strict scrutiny.253  If both the Equal Protection Clause and
the Larson test require strict scrutiny for laws that prefer some de-
nominations over others, are there any circumstances in which a
litigant would be wise to advance one argument over the other?
It appears that regardless of whether you are applying the
equal protection doctrine or the Larson test, a mere showing of
disparate impact is insufficient to prove a constitutional violation—
some evidence of an impermissible legislative purpose is re-
quired.254  While equal protection jurisprudence seems more con-
religious belief for the purpose of granting conscientious objector status would “result
in a denial of equal protection by preferring some religions over others—an invidious
discrimination that would run afoul of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment”); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 284 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(“To allow expression of religious views by some and deny the same privilege to others
merely because they or their views are unpopular, even deeply so, is a denial of equal
protection of the law forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
253 See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886
n.3 (1990) (“Just as we subject to the most exacting scrutiny laws that make classifica-
tions based on race or on the content of speech, so too we strictly scrutinize govern-
mental classifications based on religion.”) (citations omitted); New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam) (“Unless a classification trammels fundamental
personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion,
or alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory discrimina-
tions and require only that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legit-
imate state interest.”) (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court has developed a three-
tiered system for review under the Equal Protection Clauses.  Classifications based on
“suspect” grounds such as race merit strict scrutiny, while classifications based on
other grounds merit intermediate or rational basis scrutiny. See generally NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 6, § 14.3 at 574-78 (discussing each tier of review).  It should be
noted that strict scrutiny requires challenged legislation to serve a compelling state
interest and be the least restrictive means available to meet this purpose.  Brownstein,
supra note 242, at 104-05 provides an excellent analysis of whether religion should be
considered a “suspect” class.  I am assuming that when the Court states that laws classi-
fying on the basis of religion receive strict scrutiny that the Court is referring to laws
distinguishing between different types of religious believers.  An interesting but yet
unanswered question is what level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause
would apply to a law that distinguished between religious and non-religious persons—
under Establishment Clause doctrine, such a classification would warrant application
of the Lemon test.  However, if strict scrutiny were to apply under the Equal Protection
Clause, Lemon would become irrelevant.
254 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“[O]ur cases have not em-
braced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it
reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a
racially disproportionate impact.”); Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3 (“[G]enerally applica-
ble, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious prac-
tice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest . . . .”). See also Evans,
supra note 18, at 372 (“Larson strongly implies that impermissible intent is a require-
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cerned with establishing that a plaintiff claiming discrimination is
“similarly situated” to persons benefited by the statute in ques-
tion,255 this requirement is sometimes mandated in lower courts
deciding Larson claims as well.256  It appears that the primary differ-
ment for the invalidation of a challenged regulatory action.”); Gordon, supra note 38,
at 191 n.53 (“The Larson Court distinguished the statute in that case from laws with an
incidental disparate impact among religions on the ground that the statute involved
in Larson was not facially neutral.”).  Importantly, however, this impermissible intent
can be inferred from the fact that a statute is not facially neutral or has severe dispro-
portionate impact on certain races or religions. See, e.g., Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (“[A]n
invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the rele-
vant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race
than another.”); Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) (“If a state law dispropor-
tionately burdened a particular class of religious observers, this circumstance might
be evidence of an impermissible legislative motive.”).
255 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 6, § 10.7 at 349 (“The equal protection guar-
antees require the government to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar man-
ner.”).  Examples of cases that turned on a “similarly situated” analysis include Rostker
v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) and Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
256 The primary example is Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Olsen
involved a Larson claim brought by the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church to support
their argument that their religious use of marijuana should be exempted from the
federal criminal prohibition on marijuana on the same basis that the Native American
Church’s religious use of peyote was exempted from the general federal criminal pro-
hibition on peyote. Id. at 1459.  Although many cases involving the peyote exemption
turned on the unique political status of Native Americans and thus sidestep the funda-
mental Establishment Clause issue, the Olsen Court decided not to rest its decision on
this ground. See id. at 1464.  Instead, the Court took the questionable step of deciding
that the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church was not “similarly situated” to the Native
American Church because of the extent of the marijuana control problem and that
therefore no Larson inquiry was needed. Id. at 1463-64.  This move was heavily criti-
cized by the dissent. See id. at 1468-69. See also Lawrence, supra note 250, at 1092
(“The judges disagreed over the ‘label’ given [the plaintiff’s] constitutional challenge,
the majority choosing ‘equal protection’ and the dissent ‘denominational prefer-
ence.’  Theoretically, either label should have produced the same analysis.  Although
form should not supersede substance, the court’s characterization proved critical.”)
(footnotes omitted). See generally Cynthia S. Mazur, Marijuana as a ”Holy Sacrament”: Is
the Use of Peyote Constitutionally Distinguishable From That of Marijuana in Bona Fide Relig-
ious Ceremonies?, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 693 (1991).  The theoretical
problem with importing a “similarly situated” test into a Larson analysis is that the
Larson test implicitly carries with it a heavy presumption that any two religious groups
are similarly situated; whether there are good grounds to distinguish between them is
an inquiry that is made in deciding whether the statute has a compelling purpose
and, more importantly, is closely fitted to that purpose.  Put another way, the problem
is that a “similarly situated” analysis is empty of content unless a particular criterion is
used. See generally Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 345 (1949) (“A reasonable classification is one which in-
cludes all who are similarly situated and none who are not.  The question is, however,
what does that ambiguous and crucial phrase ‘similarly situated’ mean?”); CHOPER,
supra note 5, at 114-15 (“It is another matter, however, to permit accommodations
that treat ‘similarly situated’ religious practices differently.  The critical issue, of
course, is how the Court should determine when the similarly situated criterion is
met.”); PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 52-14.15 (3d ed. 2002) (“The
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ence between alleging a Larson violation and alleging an Equal Pro-
tection Clause violation is a procedural one: plaintiffs alleging an
Establishment Clause violation under Larson will have an easier
time establishing standing than plaintiffs alleging an Equal Protec-
tion violation, where the normal rules of standing apply.257
F. Relation to Lemon
From both a practical and a doctrinal point of view, the most
important question concerning the Larson test is its relationship to
the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause test, which was estab-
lished in Lemon v. Kurtzman.258  In its current form, the Lemon test
applies to laws that prefer religion over nonreligion, and invali-
dates such laws if they have a primary purpose or effect of advanc-
ing religion.259  The Court generally relies on four criteria to
determine whether a law has the effect of advancing religion:
whether it endorses religion, indoctrinates religious belief, catego-
similarly situated test is not wrong in principle.  Its vice is [in practice]: the test does
not supply the crucial criteria that are required to determine who is similarly situated
to whom, and what kinds of differences in treatment are appropriate to those who are
not similarly situated.”).  The relevant criterion is the purpose of the legislation. See
Tussman & tenBroek, supra, at 346 (“where are we to look for the test of similarity of
situation which determines the reasonableness of a classification?  The inescapable
answer is that we must look beyond the classification to the purpose of the law.”);
Laycock, supra note 40, at 996 (“[T]here is the purpose of the classification.  What it
means to be similarly situated depends on why we are asking.”).  The Larson test re-
quires that purpose to be a compelling one and the distinction between any two relig-
ious groups to be narrowly tailored to that purpose.  By using a “similarly situated”
analysis as a threshold qualifier, the Court in Olsen failed to articulate the relevant
criterion and may have found the two religious groups not similarly situated on a basis
other than one related to a compelling purpose.
257 An example of this is Children’s Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Min de Parle, 212
F.3d 1084, 1089-90 n.4 (8th Cir. 2000), where the defendants argued at both the trial
and appellate level that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge a denominational pref-
erence on the ground that plaintiffs were not “similarly situated” because they had no
particular religious beliefs.  The Court found that traditional taxpayer standing was
sufficient and that a similarly situated analysis was unnecessary.  This issue is discussed
in more detail in the next section. See also Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separa-
tionism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 270 n.297 (1994) (“[T]he Establishment Clause
may serve the sole function in a case like [Kiryas Joel] of supporting standing to sue for
those other than the victims of this discrimination.  A sect denied equal treatment
would presumably have a good equal protection complaint, while a third party with-
out equal protection standing would have Establishment Clause standing.”).
Hypothetically speaking, should a doctrinal revolution occur and the Establishment
Clause ever be un-incorporated, see supra note 31, the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause would still impose a Larson-like restriction on states’ ability to
discriminate against particular denominations.  However, standing in such cases
would be more difficult to obtain.
258 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
259 Id.
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rizes according to religion, or creates an excessive entanglement
with religion.260  Laws that have the purpose or effect of advancing
religion are per se invalid under Lemon, and there is no considera-
tion of whether the law advances a compelling state interest.261
Disregarding the Court’s repeated statements that Lemon ap-
plies to laws that prefer religion over non-religion and Larson ap-
plies to laws that prefer some religions over others, might there be
any instance where application of the Lemon test would validate leg-
islation that would be found invalid upon application of the Larson
test?
It appears that a Lemon analysis and a Larson analysis would
reach the same result in the vast majority, if not all, of cases.  Laws
that would warrant strict scrutiny under Larson because they create
denominational preferences will frequently lack a primarily secular
purpose under Lemon.262  More importantly, a denominational
preference almost by definition endorses the religious beliefs of
that denomination, rendering the practice invalid under the en-
dorsement inquiry of the “effects” prong of Lemon.263  Other laws
creating denominational preferences will also create an excessive
government entanglement with religion under Lemon, such as the
law at issue in Larson itself.264
Larson does have the virtue of not being saddled with Lemon’s
long and tortuous history.  That history has allowed the Court to
find some support for virtually any interpretation of the Lemon
test’s meaning.265  In this respect, Larson has less “play” in its terms
than Lemon.  At the same time, however, the Court has shown a
260 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 808 (2000) (plurality).
261 See Evans, supra note 18, at 361 n.1 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 846-47 n.1 (1st ed. 1978)): “[N]otions of compelling justification
have been employed only in free exercise cases; government actions have been
deemed either violative of the anti-establishment principle or not—the balancing pro-
cess in that setting has been incorporated into the definitions of the terms
themselves.”
262 The possible exception is government efforts to “accommodate” the religious
beliefs of certain groups.
263 For example, a law that gave Catholics, and only Catholics, a tax break would
probably be seen by an objective observer as government endorsement of
Catholicism.
264 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).  It is worth mentioning the argument
made briefly by Winslow, supra note 212, at 1304, that the application of Larson must
be preceded by an analysis of entanglement.  This seems doctrinally unsound, as the
application of Larson does not have any effect if there is already a finding of entangle-
ment under Lemon.  Further, it is easy to imagine problematic denominational prefer-
ences that do not create traditional entanglements, such as direct monetary
appropriations to a single religious sect.
265 See supra Section III.
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willingness to not apply Larson when it wishes to uphold challenged
legislation or conduct.266  Lower courts occasionally adopt a similar
tactic, and hold that even legislation that singles out a particular
denomination does not warrant strict scrutiny because no other de-
nominations are “similarly situated” to the favored religious
group.267
The Court missed opportunities to apply Larson, or at least
provide a clearer explanation as to when it does not apply, in the
1980s and early 1990s.  This may have occurred because of the con-
troversy surrounding Lemon.  Opponents of the Lemon test
mounted a steady campaign to have it overturned,268 while sup-
porters of the test tried to apply Lemon whenever possible in order
to demonstrate its usefulness.269  In effect, the jurisprudence which
developed around Larson fell casualty in what both sides viewed as
the more important battle over Lemon.  However, now that a re-
vised version of Lemon has received support from even the most
conservative Justices on the Court,270 attention could again turn to
Larson.  Practically speaking, whether the Court’s aversion to de-
nominational preferences leads it to apply a more stringent Lemon
test or to use the Larson test may not affect the outcome in a partic-
ular case.
An analysis of Larson and other Supreme Court doctrine indi-
cates that the test probably applies to discrimination between reli-
gions in the broadest terms, and prohibits both tangible and non-
266 See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Marsh, 463 U.S. 783; Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573.
267 See cases cited supra notes 256-57.
268 At various times, several currently sitting Justices have argued for Lemon to be
overruled, including Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and O’Connor.
The literature on Lemon is extensive. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-112
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (severely criticizing Lemon); Acklin, supra note 186,
at 50 n.57 (collecting opinions from several Justices criticizing Lemon); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 799 (1993) (“Let the joyous
word be spread, Lemon v. Kurtzman at last is dead!”); Steffey, supra note 22, at 903
(“Lemon’s influence is clearly waning, and its status as the principal constitutional
gauge appears to be over.”).
269 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 710 (1994) (Black-
mun, J., concurring) (“I write separately only to note my disagreement with any sug-
gestion that today’s decision signals a departure from the principles described in
Lemon v. Kurtzman”); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 696 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“That the
Court today returns to the settled analysis of our prior cases gratifies that hope.  At
the same time, the Court’s less-than-vigorous application of the Lemon test suggests
that its commitment to those standards may only be superficial.”); Daniel O. Conkle,
Lemon Lives, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 865, 866 (1993) (“[W]here others see unwork-
able incoherence, I see the exercise of judgment.”).
270 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (Lemon applied in opinion
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas).
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tangible preferences.  The Court’s prior distinction between dis-
crimination on the basis of religious affiliation (Larson) and relig-
ious belief (Gillette) is likely unwarranted, and may be disregarded
in the future.  Considered in conjunction with the Free Exercise
and Equal Protection Clauses, Larson seems to act principally as a
guarantee of third-party standing.  Furthermore, it is difficult to im-
agine instances where Larson would result in a different outcome
than a fairly applied Lemon test.  Given that cases involving denomi-
national preferences are only a small sub-set of Establishment
Clause cases, that occasions when the Free Exercise and Equal Pro-
tection Clauses would not lead to the same result are few, and that
occasions when Lemon would not demand the same result are even
fewer, the Larson doctrine probably merits the obscurity it has long
received.  However, several recent lower courts have applied Lar-
son, and a close examination of these decisions will shed light on
whether the test retains any relevance.
VI. LARSON IN THE LOWER COURTS
Considering the paucity of Supreme Court cases applying the
Larson test, it would be reasonable to infer that denominational
preferences do not occur frequently.271  After all, even the city
council members in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah272
knew enough to craft their ordinances to appear neutral and not
explicitly discriminatory towards practitioners of Santeria.  Like-
wise, the New York State legislators in Kiryas Joel were careful to
grant the village as a legal entity the power to form a school board
instead of directly delegating authority to the village’s religious
leaders.273  So, perhaps the Larson strict scrutiny test is rarely ap-
plied because its trigger, denominational preferences, are so rarely
found?
A close look at lower court opinions demonstrates that explicit
denominational preferences are still found in a wide variety of leg-
271 Cf. Choper, supra note 209, at 957 (“Statutes that on their face put one or all
religions in a disadvantageous position are quite unusual.”).
272 508 U.S. 520 (1993). Hialeah involved city ordinances nominally forbidding
animal cruelty.  The Supreme Court found instead that they were motivated by a de-
sire to prevent practitioners of Santeria from conducting animal sacrifices. Id. at 534
(“The record in this case compels the conclusion that suppression of the central ele-
ment of the Santeria worship service was the object of the ordinances.”). See also
Lupu, supra note 257, at 266 (“[T]he language, history, structure of inclusions and
exclusions, and inevitable operation of the [city] ordinances taken together con-
vinced all nine Justices quite readily that they were confronting a blatant example of
religious gerrymander.”).
273 See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 693 (1994).
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islation.  Although a discussion of all of these cases is impossible,274
this section examines the impact and interpretation of Larson in
state courts and inferior federal courts by looking at an especially
clear example of a statutory denominational preference.  This sec-
tion also discusses kosher fraud laws because lower courts often fo-
cus their Larson analyses on these laws.
A discussion of Larson in the lower courts serves three main
purposes.  First, and perhaps most importantly, it demonstrates
that the judicial examination of denominational preferences is not
merely an academic exercise—the meaning of the Larson test has a
significant impact in people’s lives.  Second, such a discussion il-
luminates the practical difficulties that courts have in applying Lar-
son.  This section will address why lower courts sometimes avoid
274 This section focuses, for clarity of analysis, on laws that explicitly name a particu-
lar religious denomination for special treatment.  As Larson held, of course, denomi-
national preferences can also be created by facially neutral laws that are “religious
gerrymanders,” or by truly neutral laws that are applied selectively to create denomina-
tional preferences. See supra note 168.  An excellent example of a lower court deci-
sion involving the former situation can be found in Church of Scientology v. Clearwater, 2
F.3d 1514 (11th Cir. 1993), where officials in the city of Clearwater, Florida crafted a
charitable regulatory statute “driven by an upsurge of sectarian fervor, intent on driv-
ing Scientology from Clearwater.” Id. at 1531.  One city official stated that
Scientology, “has to be treated like a cancer—first you arrest its growth, then remove
it from the city . . . .” Id. at 1533.  Another argued that “total condemnation of all the
Scientologist’s [sic] property in the city might be a workable solution to this problem
facing the City.  This might even give them the needed boost to decide to relocate.”
Id. at 1534.  Other cases involving Larson and alleged denominational preferences
that are not discussed in the text include: Droz v. Comm’r, 48 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir.
1995) (upholding limitation of religious exemption from Social Security tax to mem-
bers of approved religions); Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (declining
to create religious marijuana use exemption) (discussed supra note 256); Wilson v.
NLRB, 920 F.2d 1282 (6th Cir. 1990) (striking down portion of National Labor Rela-
tions Act that preferred individuals who belonged to an organized religion) (dis-
cussed supra note 138); Sklar v. Comm’r, 282 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing
constitutionality of tax deduction for members of the Church of Scientology) (dis-
cussed supra note 185); ACLU Neb. Found. v. Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir.
2004) (striking down Ten Commandments monument) (discussed supra note 216).
See also Trucios-Haynes, supra note 17, at 200 (suggesting that certain immigration
regulations create a denominational preference).  A final example of a law that is
viewed by some commentators as creating a denominational preference, even though
it is facially neutral, is New York’s so-called “Get Law.”  This law, in effect, requires
certain Jews to receive a religious divorce before they can obtain a civil divorce. See,
e.g., Paul Finkelman, A Bad Marriage: Jewish Divorce and the First Amendment, 2 CARDOZO
WOMEN’S L.J. 131, 165 (1995) (“Only people of one particular religion, and indeed,
only some followers of the religion—Orthodox or Conservative Jews—are concerned
with this procedure.”); Linda S. Kahan, Note, Jewish Divorce and Secular Courts: The
Promise of Avitzur, 73 GEO. L.J. 193, 205 (1984) (“[A]mong those denominations that
have religious requirements concerning divorce, the state is lending support only to
particular branches of Judaism.”). See generally IRVING A. BREITOWITZ, BETWEEN CIVIL
AND RELIGIOUS LAW: THE PLIGHT OF THE AGUNAH IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1993).
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applying Larson even though a statute explicitly applies only to a
single religious denomination, and how courts determine whether
a compelling state interest exists, once a denominational prefer-
ence has been found.  Finally, this section addresses whether lower
courts achieve the same result by applying Lemon instead of Larson.
A. Christian Science and Medicare
Perhaps the paradigmatic application of the Larson strict scru-
tiny test took place in Children’s Healthcare is a Legal Duty v.
Vladeck.275  In CHILD I, as the case later became known, a group of
child welfare advocates used taxpayer standing to challenge provi-
sions of the federal Medicare act, a complex statutory scheme that,
among other things, reimburses health care providers for the ex-
penses incurred in caring for certain disabled or aged persons.
The legislation imposes severe constraints on the types of medical
care that will be reimbursed, requires caregivers to be trained and
licensed, and applies only to inspected and accredited hospitals or
other health care facilities.276  However, when Congress passed the
Medicare legislation, it created several exemptions from these re-
quirements for the “First Church of Christ, Scientist, Boston, Mas-
sachusetts[,]”277 a religious denomination that opposes all
traditional forms of medical care and believes solely in spiritual
healing.278  In effect, the legislation allowed for tax expenditures to
be used to subsidize the spiritual healing practices of a single,
named religious denomination.
The court in CHILD I found that Larson was applicable, stating
that the court “[did] not have the luxury, of finding a lack of dis-
crimination between sects, as it is apparent on the face of the
275 938 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Minn. 1996). See generally Danyll Foix, From Exemptions of
Christian Science Sanatoria to Persons Who Engage in Healing by Spiritual Means: Why Chil-
dren’s Healthcare v. Vladeck Necessitates Amending the Social Security Act, 15 LAW &
INEQ. 373 (1997).
276 See CHILD I, 938 F. Supp. at 1469-70.
277 See id. at 1469.
278 See id. (“A primary tenet of Christian Science is the belief that disease is caused
by sin and mortal frailties; accordingly, physical healing is believed to be dependent
on prayer instead of medical technology.”); Foix, supra note 275, at 375-81 (discussing
Christian Science and its members’ beliefs, and noting that the First Church of Christ,
Scientist operates twenty-three spiritual healing sanatoria across the United States);
MEAD, supra note 204, at 105 (quoting MARY BAKER EDDY, SCIENCE AND HEALTH WITH
KEY TO THE SCRIPTURES (1980)) (noting that the founder of Christian Science stated
that “the only reality of sin, sickness, or death is the awful fact that unrealities seem
real to human, erring belief, until God strips off their disguise.  They are not true,
because they are not of God.”).
110 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:53
Acts.”279  Further, it rejected the argument, put forth by the gov-
ernment and Christian Scientists, that the Larson denominational
preference test does not apply to attempts to accommodate relig-
ion.280  Applying Larson, the court found that although a compel-
ling interest existed in “ensur[ing] that all those who pay taxes to
support [Medicare] programs may benefit from them,”281 the ex-
emptions were not closely fitted to that interest since they accom-
modated only Christian Scientists and no other religious
denominations who may believe in spiritual healing.282
Thus, CHILD I is a textbook example of Larson.283  The court
found a denominational preference existed because of the fact that
the statute named only one religious denomination, and held that
the existence of an exemption for religious groups was compelling.
However, it determined that the sect-specific exemption was too
narrow.  As we will see, other cases that may at first seem as straight-
279 CHILD I, 938 F. Supp. at 1481 n.27.
280 See id. at 1473 (“Nowhere in Larson or the subsequent cases are [attempts to
accommodate] distinguishing factors; instead, the sole distinguishing factor Larson
espouses is a differentiation between religious groups on the face of a statute.”).  This
holding is not favored by some commentators who argue that sect-specific exemptions
should be held to a lower standard, as discussed supra Section VI.D.
281 CHILD I, 938 F. Supp. at 1478.
282 The government argued that the legislation singled out Christian Science for
the exemptions because it was the only religious group known to Congress at the time
that practiced spiritual healing and operated its own health care facilities. See id. at
1480.  The Court, relying on Kiryas Joel, responded that it “may not assume that there
is not nor will there ever be a group in a situation similar to that of the Christian
Scientists’ current position in order to justify the restriction.” Id. See also Foix, supra
note 275, at 416 n.290 (discussing the spiritual healing practices of other religious
denominations).  In a related issue, the Court held that taxpayer status could give rise
to standing under the Establishment Clause, without the need for the plaintiffs to
show that they were similarly situated as they would have to do under the Equal Pro-
tection Clauses. See CHILD I, 938 F. Supp. at 1482-83.
283 The government appealed the decision in CHILD I, but then withdrew the ap-
peal after deciding that success was unlikely. See Foix, supra note 275, at 411.  Instead,
Congress passed legislation to create sect-neutral exemptions for the use of spiritual
healing. See Children’s Healthcare is a Legal Duty Inc. v. Min de Parle, 212 F.3d 1084,
1089 (8th Cir. 2000).  These exemptions were challenged as creating a religious gerry-
mander for the Christian Scientists. But a divided Court of Appeals found them valid
under both Larson and Lemon, arguing that each of the eligibility requirements to
receive federal funds has valid secular justifications and thus do not create a religious
gerrymander. Id. at 1091.  In contrast, the dissent argued, “It is apparent that the
definition and qualifying criteria, though not entirely devoid of secular bases, are
drawn to benefit a single sect.” Id. at 1104 (Lay, J., dissenting). The majority was
careful, however, to note that a denominational preference need not always consist of
benefiting or burdening a sect by name. See id. at 1090 (“Such discrimination can be
evidenced by objective factors such as the law’s legislative history and its practical
effect while in operation.”).  The Ninth Circuit recently upheld the exemptions as
well, although it did not discuss Larson. See Kong v. Scully, 341 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir.
2003).
2005] STRICT SCRUTINY 111
forward as CHILD I have often met with more difficulty in the
courts.
B. Kosher Fraud Laws
A basic religious obligation held by members of the Orthodox
and Conservative branches of Judaism, but not necessarily mem-
bers of the Reformed branch, is that only kosher food should be
consumed.284  Kosher food is prepared according to strict guide-
lines that delineate everything from how animals are to be slaugh-
tered to which foods can be eaten or displayed together.285
Importantly, kosher food is not viewed by most ritual observers as
being necessarily more healthy or sanitary than non-kosher food;
instead, eating kosher food is seen by observant Jews as a demon-
stration of personal self-control related in part to conceptions of
purity and holiness.286
A difficult issue for many courts erupted in the early 1990s and
continues today: the constitutionality of kosher fraud legislation.
Statutes regulating the preparation and labeling of food sold as
“kosher” are designed to prevent a problem in what is now a multi-
billion dollar industry:287 unscrupulous merchants sell food falsely
284 See Mark A. Berman, Kosher Fraud Statutes and the Establishment Clause: Are They
Kosher?, 26 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 7-8 (1992).  This is by far the best law review
article for background on Jewish dietary laws and their origins, although several im-
portant kosher fraud cases were decided after this article’s publication.  Other sources
on the cases discussed in this section include Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil
Law: Using Secular Law to Assure Observance of Practices With Religious Significance, 71 S.
CAL. L. REV. 781 (1998); Rosenthal, supra note 17; Jared Jacobson, Comment, Com-
mack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Rubin: Are Kosher Food Consumers No Longer
Entitled to Protection From Fraud and Misrepresentation in the Marketplace?, 75 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 485 (2001); Karen Ruth Lavy Lindsay, Comment, Can Kosher Fraud Statutes Pass
the Lemon Test?:  The Constitutionality of Current and Proposed Statutes, 23 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 337 (1998); Gerald F. Masoudi, Comment, Kosher Food Regulation and the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 667 (1993); Shelly R. Meacham, Note,
Answering to a Higher Source: Does the Establishment Clause Actually Restrict Kosher Regula-
tions as Ran-Dav’s County Kosher Proclaims?, 23 SW. U. L. REV. 639 (1994); Kristin
Morgan, Note, The Constitutionality of New Jersey Kosher Food Regulations Under the Estab-
lishment Clause: Ran-Dav’s County Kosher v. State, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 247 (1993); Cath-
erine Beth Sullivan, Comment, Are Kosher Fraud Laws Constitutionally Kosher?, 21 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 201 (1993).
285 Berman, supra note 284, at 1.
286 Id. at 4-5 (“kosher food is not necessarily any cleaner, nor any healthier, than
non-kosher food” and “there is general agreement among Orthodox and Conserva-
tive authorities that the rationale for the dietary laws has [to do] . . . with personal
self-control.”).
287 See Jacobson, supra note 284, at 492 (describing fifty billion dollar kosher food
industry).
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labeled as “kosher” in order to reap higher profits.288  In response
to perceived widespread fraud, almost half of all States have passed
laws to ensure that food sold as kosher is “actually” kosher by defin-
ing what kosher requires, paying inspectors (frequently, but not
always, rabbis) to ensure that merchants follow the requirements,
and imposing monetary fines or possible jail sentences on manu-
facturers who fail to meet the requirements.289  Although these
laws obviously present an issue under Lemon as to whether they
have the purpose or effect of advancing religion, the Larson de-
nominational preferences test is frequently implicated as well be-
cause most of the statutes define “kosher” by reference to the
Orthodox branch’s interpretation.290
Kosher fraud laws can thus create denominational preferences
in three different ways.  In the broadest sense, these laws could be
seen as preferring Judaism over other religions, especially others
religions that also have strict dietary laws, such as Islam.291  They
are also problematic because they usually prefer the Orthodox def-
inition of “kosher” over the Conservative branch’s definition of the
word.292  Although the two branches largely agree on the source of
288 See Berman, supra note 284, at 2 (“[T]here is money to be made in the kosher
food industry by cutting corners.  Since the price of many kosher foods includes a
premium to cover the added costs of kosher preparation, profits can increase sharply
if a non-kosher product is sold as kosher, at the kosher food price.”).
289 As of 1997, twenty-two states had kosher fraud legislation. See Rosenthal, supra
note 17, at 962.
290 Id. (stating that eighteen of the twenty-two statutes define kosher according to
“Orthodox Hebrew religious requirements”).
291 Much like some Jews who strictly observe the practice of eating only food that is
kosher, many Muslims only eat food that is “halal.” Compare Rain Levy Minns, Note,
Food Fights: Redefining the Current Boundaries of the Government’s Positive Obligation to Pro-
vide Halal, 17 J.L. & POL. 713, 734-35 (2001) (“In order to have truly equal legal pro-
tection of Islamic religious practice, all of the states with kosher consumer protection
labeling laws should either also have halal laws or not have any religious food labeling
laws at all.”) with Rosenthal, supra note 17, at 968 (“[I]t is difficult to say that Muslims
and Jews receive disparate protection from kosher fraud laws.  Indeed, Muslims
should properly be classed as beneficiaries of the laws.”).  Minns seems to have the
stronger position here, noting that although many Muslims in western countries eat
kosher food as a compromise since halal is rarely available, full equality between Islam
and Judaism would require government protection of both dietary codes. See Minns,
supra, at 719. But see Greenawalt, supra note 284, at 806 (arguing that laws governing
kosher food do not discriminate against Muslims and stating that Muslims “have not
pressed for such help”).
292 See Berman, supra note 284, at 65 (“the statutes, on their face, prefer the Ortho-
dox denomination of Judaism, thus discriminating against other denominations.”);
Rosenthal, supra note 17, at 964 (“A statute based on an Orthodox definition of ko-
sher protects Conservative Jews equally only to the extent that they share Orthodox
standards.”); Lindsay, supra note 284, at 365 (“by adopting an Orthodox Jewish stan-
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the laws governing kosher food,293 there are some important differ-
ences between how the two branches interpret the requirement.
For example:
Conservative Judaism accepts sturgeon, swordfish, all cheeses,
and all wines as kosher.  Orthodox authorities do not accept the
[kosher status] of sturgeon and swordfish . . . .  In addition, Or-
thodox rabbis accept only cheeses and wines that have fulfilled
certain . . . requirements that the Conservative movement no
longer deems applicable.294
Finally, the laws present a possible denominational preference in
their application because there are disagreements within the Or-
thodox branch as to what foods should be considered kosher.295
The first major challenge to a kosher fraud law on Establish-
ment Clause grounds was litigated in Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, Inc.
v. New Jersey.296  In Ran-Dav’s, State authorities sought an injunction
to prevent the owners and operators of a grocery store from hold-
ing themselves out as sellers of kosher food.297  The State argued
that the store had violated New Jersey’s kosher fraud law298 by,
among other things, mislabeling products, failing to properly re-
move the veins from calf tongues, and selling hamburger meat
without the blood being first removed.299  The grocery store ar-
gued in a facial challenge that “so long as they . . . conformed to
the Kosher standards established by their supervising rabbi, the
State [was] without authority to establish different religious stan-
dards to which plaintiffs must conform.”300
The Appellate Division of the Superior Court focused prima-
dard for kosher, many statutes are implicitly stating a preference for Orthodox Juda-
ism over other branches of Judaism.”).
293 Berman, supra note 283, at 61; Jacobson, supra note 284, at 489 n.25 (quoting
Brief of the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs as Amicus Curiae
at 9, Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat and Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337 (4th Cir.
1995) (No. 94-1918)).
294 Berman, supra note 284, at 8-9 (footnotes omitted).
295 Id. at 8 n.31 (discussing internal disagreements); Greenawalt, supra note 284, at
808 (“Disagreement among Orthodox Jews about kosher requirements is a fact of life.
Some groups are stricter than others, and no centralized authority exists to resolve
disagreements.”). See also Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d
415, 426 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that Orthodox Jews of the Sephardic sect adhere to
stricter standards of animal slaughtering than other Orthodox Jews).
296 579 A.2d 316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), rev’d, 608 A.2d 1353 (N.J. 1992).
297 Id. at 318.
298 The pertinent regulations defined “kosher” as food “prepared and maintained
in strict compliance with the laws and customs of the Orthodox Jewish religion.” Id.
at 319 (citation omitted).
299 Id. at 321-22.
300 Id. at 319.
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rily on Lemon in upholding the kosher fraud legislation, but re-
sponded briefly to an ACLU amicus brief arguing for application
of Larson on the ground that the laws preferred Orthodox Judaism
over other branches.  The Court noted that representatives from
all of the major branches of Judaism supported kosher legislation
and agreed to its basic principles,301 and that the State had con-
ceded at oral argument that persons selling what they in good faith
believed was kosher food would be exempted from the require-
ments.302  The Court then concluded that:
Some Conservative and some divergent Orthodox interpreta-
tions do present small variations from the mainstream, but they
do not pretend to be adopting different standards; they merely
advance their interpretations of the same Orthodox standards
. . . .  If the State attempted to hold these groups to the majority
Orthodox interpretation, we might have some disagreement;
but since the State has conceded far more than would be re-
quired to support these minor variations, we see no basis for a
[Larson] attack.303
In other words, the Court decided that a denominational pref-
erence did not exist because all of the branches of Judaism basi-
cally understood “kosher” to mean “according to Orthodox rules”
and that any minor variations would be solved by the State’s agree-
ment not to prosecute different interpretations made in good
faith.304  The Court did not consider whether the existence of ko-
sher fraud laws themselves constituted a denominational prefer-
ence for Judaism over other faiths with religious dietary
requirements.
In a controversial 4-3 decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court
reversed the lower court.305  The Supreme Court relied on the ef-
301 Id. at 325.  Berman argues that this holding was erroneous because “to permit
the State to enact that unitary standard in a civil statute is to make the absurd argu-
ment that the Establishment Clause should be interpreted to prohibit the establish-
ment of religion, unless everyone agrees that one religious interpretation is correct.”
Berman, supra note 284, at 62.
302 Ran-Dav’s, 579 A.2d at 323 n.14.
303 Id. at 325.  A dissenting opinion relied on Lemon, but did not clearly invoke
Larson.  Id. at 330 (D’Annunzio, J., dissenting).
304 Interestingly, it appears that the good-faith defense allowed by the State would
apply only to a good-faith belief that food was kosher according to Orthodox require-
ments. See id. at 323-24.  That is, if a seller admitted that food was not kosher according
to traditional Orthodox requirements as embedded in the legislation, but argued that
it was kosher according to Conservative Judaism or a personal interpretation, he or
she might not be allowed to use the good-faith defense.
305 Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, Inc. v. New Jersey, 608 A.2d 1353 (N.J. 1992).
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fects and entanglement prongs306 of the Lemon test to invalidate
the kosher fraud legislation, stating that “the regulations impose
substantive religious standards for the kosher-products industry
and authorize civil enforcement of those religious standards with
the assistance of clergy, directly and substantially entangling gov-
ernment in religious matters.”307  Interestingly, the State aban-
doned the “good faith” defense it had offered in the Appellate
Division and instead argued that “merchants sincerely believing
that their products are kosher could nevertheless be prosecuted
under the regulations if the State believes that their products do
not conform to the standards of Orthodox Judaism as the State
defines and applies them.”308
Although the Court recognized that this undermined a pri-
mary ground for the Appellate Division’s holding that Larson was
inapplicable, it held that “despite [its] doubts”309 it would not ap-
ply the denominational preferences test “primarily because the re-
cord suggests uncertainty concerning both the precise meaning
and the enforcement standards of the regulations.”310 Since the
regulations clearly violated Lemon, there was no need to resolve the
question of whether they also violated Larson.311
These statements indicate that a reference to a particular de-
nomination in a statute does not necessarily constitute a denomi-
national preference for that denomination, or perhaps that a
minor or trivial preference for a denomination does not merit
strict scrutiny.  Yet another possibility is that the Court simply
found the long-established Lemon test a more defensible method
for invalidating legislation than the largely dormant Larson test.  As
in the Appellate Division, the New Jersey Supreme Court did not
consider whether the kosher fraud laws constituted a general de-
nominational preference for Judaism over other religions, indicat-
306 Id. at 1366.
307 Id. at 1355.
308 Id. at 1359.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 Id.  In a curious statement, a dissenting opinion argued without elaboration that
“the regulations need not be subjected to a strict-scrutiny analysis as articulated in
[Larson] because they do not discriminate among different religions or religious
sects.” Id. at 1370 (Stein, J., dissenting).  In response to the Court’s ruling, the New
Jersey legislature adopted a much more modest law that required sellers of kosher
food to inform customers as to what basis they believed it was kosher. See Minns, supra
note 291, at 726 n.66.  Notably, there are several dozen organizations and individual
rabbis across the United States who certify food and allow a unique mark to be placed
on the product’s packaging to better help consumers determine if food is kosher.
Berman, supra note 284, at 11-12; Jacobson, supra note 284, at 496.
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ing that perhaps the Court believed that only preferences within
religions are subject to the Larson test.
While Ran-Dav’s was still on appeal, a second major Establish-
ment Clause challenge to a kosher fraud law was brought by a hot
dog vendor against Baltimore city ordinances in Barghout v.
Mayor.312  Although originally brought in federal district court, the
district judge certified the question to the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals to determine whether Baltimore’s kosher fraud legislation
provided a good-faith defense and whether the law was valid under
the Maryland Constitution.313  The Court of Appeals found that
the statute did allow for a good-faith defense314 and, although not-
ing that the Maryland Constitution does not have an establishment
clause,315 ventured the opinion that “[s]ince kosher is based on
Orthodox Jewish standards, a statutory provision that food is prop-
erly labeled kosher only if it satisfies Orthodox Jewish standards
does not create a denominational preference.”316
Nevertheless, after receiving answers to the certified questions,
the Federal District Court for Maryland invalidated the kosher
fraud legislation based on the effects and entanglement prongs of
Lemon.317  The Court noted that the laws were “quite literally, an
endorsement of orthodox Judaism, for the City has effectively
placed its stamp of approval on orthodox Judaism,”318 however, it
did not even cite to Larson, much less apply the denominational
preference strict scrutiny test.
In contrast, Larson and denominational preferences played a
312 600 A.2d 841 (Md. 1992).  The plaintiff was fined for allowing grease from non-
kosher hot dogs to drip onto kosher hot dogs, thus rendering them no longer kosher.
See id. at 843.  The Baltimore City ordinance required food sold as kosher to “adhere
to and abide by the orthodox Hebrew religious rules and regulations and the dietary
laws . . .” Id. at 843 (citations omitted).
313 Id. at 841-42.
314 Id. at 844.
315 Id. at 849 (“It is apparent to us that [our Constitution] does not contain an
establishment clause, which would prohibit government from setting up a church,
giving preferential treatment to any religion or coercing belief or disbelief in any
religion.”).
316 Id. at 847.  Aside from the ultimate question of whether or not the statutes cre-
ate denominational preferences, this statement by the Court seems especially prob-
lematic as it is definitively stating what kosher means even when presented with
evidence that other branches of Judaism may have different definitions of kosher.
This statement is somewhat similar to that of the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate
Division in Ran-Dav’s.  Ran Dav’s County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 579 A.2d 316, 325 (N.J.
1990)
317 See Barghout v. Mayor, 833 F. Supp. 540, 550 (D. Md. 1993), aff’d, 66 F.3d 1337
(4th Cir. 1995).
318 Id. at 549.
2005] STRICT SCRUTINY 117
major role when Baltimore appealed to the Fourth Circuit.  In an
interesting decision, all three judges on the Fourth Circuit panel
found Baltimore’s kosher fraud legislation unconstitutional.319
One judge found it invalid under Lemon,320 one found it invalid
under Larson,321 and the third found it invalid under both Lemon
and Larson.322
Judge Lay, who found the law invalid solely under Lemon
noted that, as in Ran-Dav’s, representatives from all the major
branches of Judaism rely on the Orthodox standard to define the
term “kosher.”323  He argued that the record was inadequate to
make a finding of a denominational preference “because neither
the district court nor the City addressed this issue, [and] because
the district court made no specific factual finding as to whether all
sects of Judaism rely on the Orthodox standard . . . .”324  He con-
cluded that “all of the various sects of the Jewish faith agree that
kosher standards are determined by reference to Orthodox Jewish
law [and] [t]he mere fact that various sects may have different in-
terpretations does not create an intra-faith dispute as to the basic
meaning of what is and is not kosher.”325
These statements did not satisfy another judge on the panel
who argued that the laws “unquestionably expressed an impermis-
sible intra-faith denominational preference for Orthodox Juda-
ism”326 and that even if the word “kosher” were understood to
mean the same thing by all Jewish religious observers, the law
would still create a denominational preference by singling out the
Orthodox for special protection instead of the Conservative or Re-
formed branches.327  He concluded that even if the statutes have a
compelling purpose in preventing fraudulent labeling, they were
not narrowly tailored to meet that interest.328
In the most recent challenge to a kosher fraud law, a butcher
shop on Long Island brought suit alleging that New York State’s
legislation violated the Establishment Clause.329  A federal district
319 See Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat and Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337 (4th
Cir. 1995).
320 Id. at 1342 (Lay, J.).
321 Id. at 1346 (Luttig, J., concurring).
322 Id. at 1349-50 (Wilkins, J., concurring).
323 Id. at 1341 n.9 (Lay, J.).
324 Id. at 1342 n.9.
325 Id. at 1341 n.9.
326 Id. at 1348 (Luttig, J., concurring).
327 Id.
328 Id. at 1349 (Luttig, J., concurring).
329 Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Rubin, 106 F. Supp. 2d 445
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court in New York found the legislation invalid under the effects
and entanglement prongs of Lemon without discussing Larson.330  A
unanimous panel of the Second Circuit affirmed.  Although the
Court mentioned, at least six times,331 that the legislation prefers
the Orthodox view of kosher, it did not apply Larson because “the
laws fail the test of constitutionality even using the assumptions
that are most accommodating to the State.”332  Instead, the Court
conducted the standard Lemon analysis and found, as the district
court had, that the legislation was invalid under the effects and
entanglement prongs.333
Thus three final court decisions have found that substantially
similar kosher fraud laws are invalid under the Establishment
Clause.  The New Jersey Supreme Court referenced Larson, but de-
clined to apply it because of purported uncertainty over what the
statutory language meant.  Two of the three judges on the Fourth
Circuit found Larson clearly applicable, while all three judges on
the Second Circuit simply decided that applying Larson was unnec-
essary since the statute failed the Lemon test.
How do we make sense of these very different outcomes?  One
explanation is that there is a disagreement over how much weight
should be afforded to a denominational preference that may be
rare in practice, or otherwise trivial or formalistic.  One view seems
to favor substantive neutrality (ensuring that practically, in the vast
majority of cases, there will be no preferences for members of dif-
ferent sects) while the second favors both substantive and formal
neutrality (ensuring also that statutes do not contain explicit refer-
ences to particular denominations).334  Notably, the courts that
(E.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d, 294 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2002). See generally Jacobson, supra note
284.
330 Commack, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 459.  The relevant statute defined kosher food as
food prepared “in accordance with orthodox Hebrew religious requirements.” Id. at
452.
331 Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 425-27, 430 (2d Cir.
2002).
332 Id. at 425 n.7.
333 Id. at 432.
334 See generally Laycock, supra note 40. See Rosenthal, supra note 17, at 965 (“Judge
Luttig’s theory of underinclusion of Conservative Jews approaches the vanishing point
of significance.  One should be especially reluctant to condemn an effective con-
sumer protection standard on underinclusiveness grounds when there is no evidence
that the alleged victim of the standard feels slighted by it in any way.”).  Berman, on
the other hand, suggests that the disagreements are far more significant. See Berman,
supra note 284, at 61-62. A third, but probably problematic view, is that the decision
should be made according to what the disadvantaged group thinks of the preference.
Under this argument, if Conservative Jews feel the preference is trivial, kosher laws
should not be struck down. See Greenawalt, supra note 284, at 792-93.
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found Larson applicable considered preferences between branches
of Judaism to be the relevant grounds of contrast and were not
concerned about disputes within Orthodox Judaism or between Ju-
daism and other religions.
Another explanation is that lower courts may be reluctant to
find a denominational preference because doing so substantially
limits their options.  As discussed previously,335 Lemon has become
an extraordinarily flexible set of “guideposts” with a long history
from which very divergent positions may reasonably be drawn.  In
contrast, Larson substantially narrows a court’s discretion if it finds
a denominational preference.  As one commentator states,
“[b]ecause strict scrutiny is almost always fatal to government ac-
tion, litigation usually centers on the issue of classification as de-
nominational preference rather than the issue of whether an
action can survive strict scrutiny.”336 Lemon’s malleable standards
are likely viewed as a source of flexibility to some judges but as a
source of confusion to others.  The result is that while some judges
may view Larson as a strong, straightforward method of uncovering
breaches in the “wall” of separation between church and state,
others may view it as a blunt instrument unsuited to the delicate
task of discerning permissible from impermissible government in-
volvement with religion.
The continued validity of the Larson test is clearly questioned
by some judges.  Since announcing the denominational prefer-
ences test, the Supreme Court’s language and action has created a
doctrinal mystery about when the test should be applied.337  Many
lower courts will likely continue to be hesitant about applying Lar-
son until the Supreme Court provides a strong and clear indication
of exactly when the test is applicable, and consistently applies it in
its own cases.
The final and perhaps most likely reason for the inconsistent
application of Larson is that judges are simply much more familiar
with the Lemon Establishment Clause test.  Because Lemon allows
courts to reach the exact same result as Larson,338 judges may un-
derstandably deem it unwise to apply the more questionable and
untested doctrine.
335 See supra Section V.F.
336 Masoudi, supra note 284, at 675.
337 See supra note 17.
338 See supra Section V.F.
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CONCLUSION
Almost sixty years ago, in the first Supreme Court case apply-
ing the Establishment Clause to the states, Justice Jackson noted
that “[t]his policy of our Federal Constitution has never been
wholly pleasing to most religious groups.  They all are quick to in-
voke its protections; they all are irked when they feel its re-
straints.”339  Jackson’s dictum remains true today in the United
States, as battles over school vouchers, faith-based social programs,
and government sponsorship of religious symbols demonstrates.
The phenomena is no less pervasive in disputes over the proper
application of the Larson denominational preferences test—many
small religious groups who were pleased to see the doctrine used to
prevent government endorsement of particular mainstream reli-
gions were probably dismayed to see it also used to prevent sect-
specific “accommodation” of minority religions.
The principle embodied in the Larson test is furthered by sev-
eral of the Court’s other doctrines, including the Lemon test, strict
scrutiny for non-neutral laws under the Free Exercise Clause, and
strict scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of religion under the
Equal Protection Clause.  Perhaps Larson’s greatest virtue is the op-
portunity for lower court judges to escape the quagmire of the
Lemon test when deciding Establishment Clause cases that have an
element of denominational preference; but, as discussed, they
would probably reach the same result under either analysis.
The idea that denominational preferences are necessarily
more problematic than laws preferring religion over nonreligion is
an idea rooted in history rather than logic.  The Supreme Court
attempted to give force to this historical presumption by announc-
ing the Larson test; whether the Court’s attempt succeeded is still
difficult to determine.  Several lower courts have relied on Larson
to invalidate legislation, but several others have ignored it entirely.
The Court’s own precedents leave the impression that Larson is
only a peripheral part of modern Establishment Clause doctrine.
In many ways this is a surprising result.  Considering the fun-
damental disagreement between liberals and conservatives on the
Court regarding the proper relation between religion and govern-
ment, it would be easy to assume that the one area of agreement
they share—that denominational preferences are forbidden—
would be strongly expressed and clearly articulated.  Whether the
Court will ever give this clarity to Larson is really anyone’s guess,
339 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S.  1, 27 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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but considering that it has been over twenty years since the Larson
doctrine was announced, the Court clearly does not see it as a high
priority.
When all is said and done, is the Larson denominational pref-
erences test of any real value?  Does it actually protect unpopular
denominations against discrimination?  Right now the only credi-
ble answer to these questions is not a very satisfactory one: probably
not, but maybe.

